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(WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK
ABOUT) JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT
TERRY A. MARONEY *
Abstract: Judicial temperament is simultaneously the thing we think all judges
must have and the thing that no one can quite put a finger on. Extant accounts are
scattered and thin, and either present a laundry list of desirable judicial qualities
without articulating what (if anything) unifies the list or treat temperament as a
fundamentally mysterious quality that a judge either does or does not have. Resting so much—selection, evaluation, discipline, even removal—on such an indeterminate concept is intellectually and practically intolerable. Polarized debates
over Justice Kavanaugh’s fitness to sit on the Supreme Court made clear just how
badly we need a common vocabulary to guide our discourse on judicial temperament. This Article—the first extended scholarly treatment of the topic—posits
that, because judicial temperament is a psychological construct, we ought to draw
upon psychology to understand it. It therefore taps a deep well of scientific research to construct a new psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament. It conceives judicial temperament as a deep-seated, relatively stable set of specific personal traits—separable from intellect, training, and ideology—that, in dialectic
with specific judicial environments and the predictable demands of judging, drive
behaviors that affect how justice is delivered and perceived. The critical trait dimensions of a judge’s temperament are positive emotionality, negative emotionality, kindness, and self-regulation. The combination of these traits determines
how well or poorly her temperament will fit with any given judicial assignment.
Although judicial temperament is somewhat malleable, potential for change is
constrained. This scientifically grounded theory shows why some seldommentioned attributes—like courage—are temperamental, and other commonlycited ones—such as commitments to equality and diversity—are not. This Article
provides a principled alternative to the folk-wisdom manner in which judicial
temperament traditionally has been defined and assessed. Setting the theoretical
© 2020, Terry A. Maroney. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Professor of Medicine, Health, and Society, and Chancellor Faculty Fellow
(2017–19), Vanderbilt University. Andrew W. Mellon Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS), Stanford University, 2016–17. For research assistance, I am grateful to
Clinton Barker, Liz Berk, Jennifer Blasco, Sarah Dunaway, Jocelyn Hody, Stephen Jordan, Vidhi
Sanghavi Joshi, and Rachel Miklaszewski. Further gratitude to: CASBS and the CASBS Emotion
Study Group, particularly Batja Mesquita, Allison Pugh, Robin Stryker, Will Tiejmeijer, and Barry
Zuckerman; participants in workshops at the Berkeley Law Center for the Study of Law and Society,
Duke Law School, University of Florida Levin College of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, and
UCLA Law School; Charles Geyh; Cynthia Grey; Chris Guthrie; Sarah Igo, Dominique Behague, and
Laura Stark; James Gross; Hon. Jeremy Fogel (ret.); and Jerome Kagan.
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terms for empirical testing of its claims—and with the potential to transform processes for judicial selection, evaluation, and support—the psycho-legal theory
posited here shows what we should be talking about when we talk about judicial
temperament.

INTRODUCTION
[I]t seems to me that temperament is the key to everything else that one
does on the bench. 1
Elusive as it is important, judicial temperament is notoriously hard to define. 2

The 2018 nomination of Justice Brett Kavanaugh to the U.S. Supreme
Court sparked the most significant public debate over judicial temperament in
modern history. After his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, a
large and diverse group of detractors—including several thousand law professors—declared that his unprecedented displays of anger, discourtesy, and partisanship at that hearing revealed Kavanaugh to be temperamentally unfit. 3 Supporters (including Kavanaugh himself, writing in his own defense) declared the
opposite, and asserted that his behavior, though unusual, was appropriate for
one who believed himself to be so unfairly accused, and pointed to his many
years on the D.C. Circuit without a single temperamental complaint. 4
Tempests pass. Justice Kavanaugh was confirmed; the temperamental debate moved aside to await the next controversy; and we are, by and large, none
1
Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Confirmation of Appointees to the Federal
Judiciary Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 41 (1997) [hereinafter Confirmation
Hearings I], https://archive.org/details/confirmationhear973unit/page/40/mode/2up [https://perma.cc/
NT49-PGRE] (statement of Hon. Jeremy Fogel, nominee for the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California).
2
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED
AMERICA 6–7 (2006).
3
Opinion, The Senate Should Not Confirm Kavanaugh: Signed, 2,400+ Law Professors, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/03/opinion/kavanaugh-lawprofessors-letter.html [https://perma.cc/K32T-4794]; see Ross K. Baker, Opinion, Even with Jeff
Flake’s FBI Investigation, Brett Kavanaugh Is Unfit to Serve, USA TODAY (Sept. 30, 2018), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/09/28/brett-kavanaugh-s…committee-vote-nominationchristine-blasey-ford-column/1454562002/ [https://perma.cc/66AQ-XJTK] (“Kavanaugh was not
simply angry; he was unhinged.”).
4
Orrin Hatch, Opinion, Brett Kavanaugh’s Righteous Anger, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/brett-kavanaughs-righteous-anger-1538519713 [https://perma.cc/YT53-4H4B];
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Opinion, I Am an Independent, Impartial Judge, WALL ST. J. (last updated Oct.
4, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/i-am-an-independent-impartial-judge-1538695822 [https://
perma.cc/RQ75-WVJ8]; Rachel Ventresca, Ken Starr: Kavanaugh’s Reputation Is ‘Unblemished,’ CNN
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/05/politics/ken-starr-kavanaugh-op-ed-cnntv/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3TUR-2YCT].
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the wiser. For all the heat thrown off, we remain at best marginally more enlightened about what judicial temperament is, what function it serves, and how
it can be discerned. This narrative trajectory is not new. It is time for that trajectory to change.
Judicial temperament is simultaneously the thing we think all judges must
have and the thing that no one can quite put a finger on. And yet being perceived as having a good temperament can get a judge confirmed or elevated; a
perception of bad temperament can stop her at the gate, or, if she already is
serving, get her reprimanded or removed from the bench. 5 Indeed, long before
the Kavanaugh moment, former Senator Joseph Biden stated that in evaluating
federal court nominees he and his colleagues “worry . . . most [of all] about
temperament.” 6 It is intellectually and practically intolerable to have so much
rest on so indeterminate a concept. If this key ingredient of judicial fitness remains as “[e]lusive as it is important,” it will remain a cipher in which one sees
what one wants, in whose lack one sees what one fears. 7 We need to know
what we are talking about when we are talking about judicial temperament.
It is not that people have not tried to wrangle the concept of judicial temperament; they have. Such efforts, however, are scattered, relatively thin, and
tend to follow one of two approaches. The first approach is to present a laundry list of desirable judicial qualities and behaviors without articulating what,
if anything, unifies the list. 8 The second approach, in contrast, treats judicial
temperament as a fundamentally mysterious quality that one either has or does
not have. 9 Both approaches do a deep disservice to a critical measure of judicial fitness.
The list-of-good-things approach, for its part, is unduly capacious. Consider this sweeping concept offered by the prominent legal commentator Jeffrey Rosen, who wrote that temperament embraces “personality, character, up5
William G. Ross, The Questioning of Lower Federal Court Nominees During the Senate Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 119, 131 (2001) [hereinafter Ross, Questioning]
(describing how U.S. District Court nominee Frederica Massiah-Jackson’s nomination was withdrawn
after temperament questions were raised—for example, by a sidebar in which she told a lawyer to
“shut your fucking mouth” and another instance in which she stated, “I don’t give a fuck”).
6
Confirmation Hearings I, supra note 1, at 667 (statement of Sen. Biden); see Edward J. Devitt,
Ten Commandments for the New Judge, 65 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 574, 574 (1979) (quoting a former lord
chancellor of Great Britain as saying, “a kindly and patient man who is not a profound lawyer will
make a far better judge than an ill-tempered genius”) (ellipses omitted).
7
ROSEN, supra note 2, at 6; see Sheldon Goldman, Selecting Lower Court Federal Judges on the
Basis of Their Policy Views, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 729, 741 (2008) (describing judicial temperament as a
“vague” concept); Larry W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 B.U. L. REV. 273,
307–09 (1989) (characterizing the notion of judicial temperament as “unruly” in comparison to qualifications such as “integrity, intelligence, education, experience, [and] stamina”).
8
See infra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
9
See infra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
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bringing and education, formative career experiences, work habits, and behavior when interacting with others.” 10 We see similar sweep (and only partial
overlap) in the definition of temperament used by the influential American Bar
Association (ABA) Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary (ABA Standing Committee): “compassion, decisiveness, open-mindedness, courtesy, patience, freedom from bias and commitment to equal justice under the law.” 11
Other nominations for the category include humility, collegiality, wit, pragmatism, likability, “the capacity and inclination to treat litigants as equals,” sensitivity to racial and gender issues, not being addicted to drugs or alcohol, and
absence of a criminal record. 12
A concept that devolves to a highly diverse list of attributes that may or
may not relate to one another lacks analytic precision. It provides us inadequate tools with which to distinguish one person from another and fails to reflect the reasons for doing so. We may as well ask whether the person is, or
would be, a “good judge.”
It is no surprise, then, that the second approach utilizes this exact method,
which suffers not from too much diverse content but from few descriptors at
all. Without clear parameters upon which to rely, those asked to opine about an
actual or potential judge’s temperament typically fall back on a thumbs-up-ordown. Common among the assessments of now-Justice Elena Kagan, for example, was this comment: “[h]er temperament is splendid.” 13 The late Justice
Antonin Scalia once offered an opposing but equally conclusory selfROSEN, supra note 2, at 8.
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDING COMM. ON FED. JUDICIARY, WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT
WORKS 3 (2017) [hereinafter HOW IT WORKS]. Many state standards echo this language. See, e.g.,
AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON FED. JUDICIAL INDEP., STANDARDS ON JUDICIAL STATE SELECTION 7 (2000); UTAH STATE COURTS, MANUAL OF PROCEDURES FOR JUSTICE COURT NOMINATING COMMISSIONS 19–20 (2016) (defining judicial temperament as “common sense, compassion,
decisiveness, firmness, humility, open-mindedness, patience, tact and understanding”); see also Yackle, supra note 7, at 307 (“[T]he genuine content of these ‘qualifications’ begs for explanation.”).
12
Yackle, supra note 7, at 309 (contemplating that judicial temperament might refer to prudence,
Solomonic justice, or capacity to “keep the morally equivalent interests of all citizens in view”); see
James J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of the Organized Bar in State Judicial Selection Reform:
The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. REV. 683, 704 (2002) (outlining the argued characteristics of
judicial temperament); William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 633, 650 (1987) [hereinafter Ross,
Functions, Roles, and Duties] (quoting Laurence Tribe); Ross, Questioning, supra note 5, at 131;
Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review of Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008), 108 MICH. L. REV. 859,
875 (2010) (book review) (defining temperament as “[o]pen-mindedness, not taking oneself too seriously, wit, self-awareness, humility, being a generous and respectful colleague, and being willing to
work at getting it right . . . as Posner (and I) would agree”).
13
The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 572 (2010) (statement of Kim J.
Askew, Chair, Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, American Bar Association, quoting
questionnaire respondent).
10
11
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assessment. Asked, “Is there such thing as an ideal judicial temperament, and if
so, what is it?” he replied, “If there is one, I don’t have it.” 14
With no clear criteria to distinguish splendid from bad, or either pole
from the points in between, the utility of the concept is difficult to discern. The
concept could even have negative utility. Because of its murkiness, “judicial
temperament often has been a smoke screen for other objections to a nominee’s candidacy.” 15 When Louis Brandeis was nominated to the U.S. Supreme
Court, for example, the New York Sun called him “utterly and even ridiculously
unfit,” and a group of “prominent Bostonians, including the president of Harvard, signed a petition” attacking his temperament. 16 That accusation now
seems wildly off base in light of the reverence with which many now regard
both Brandeis the man and Brandeis the judge. The objection was likely motivated by ideology, politics, and anti-Semitism. 17 Some may make a similar
critique today by asserting that among the strongest predictors of whether one
criticized or defended Kavanaugh’s temperament was the extent to which one
was antagonistic to or aligned with his ideology.
Politics can thus infect temperament-talk, but it can also shed light on this
concept. The 2016 presidential campaign of Donald Trump sparked its own
significant public discourse on temperament. 18 Trump’s detractors uniformly
attacked his temperamental fitness to be president 19 by complaining about
“impulsivity,” “lack of restraint,” reactivity when taunted, and love of “creat-

14
Email from Alexander Boni-Saenz, Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, to author (Sept. 9, 2015, 6:48 PM) (on file with author) (recounting public exchange from February 13,
2012, between Professor Boni-Saenz and Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia).
15
Ross, Functions, Roles, and Duties, supra note 12, at 649; see William G. Ross, Participation
by the Public in the Federal Judicial Selection Process, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1, 34–37, 65 (1990) [hereinafter Ross, Participation] (illustrating how personal ideology can be used to assess nominees under
the guise of objective criteria).
16
Ross, Participation, supra note 15, at 7; see Ross, Functions, Roles, and Duties, supra note 12,
at 649 (providing examples of judicial temperament being used to signify ideology or specific beliefs
and values, such as racism).
17
Ross, Functions, Roles, and Duties, supra note 12, at 649 n.84.
18
Indeed, the sudden public focus on temperament calls to mind the sudden public focus on “empathy” occasioned by President Obama’s nomination of Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Terry A. Maroney,
The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CAL. L. REV. 629, 631 (2011); Peter Baker,
In Court Nominees, Is Obama Looking for Empathy by Another Name?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/us/politics/26memo.html [https://perma.cc/MWY6-KX5A].
19
See, e.g., John Kelly, From Jefferson to Donald Trump: A Brief History of Presidential “Temperament,” SLATE (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.slate.com/blogs/lexicon_valley/2016/08/15/from_
jefferson_to_donald_trump_a_brief_history_of_presidential_temperament.html [https://perma.cc/T37PURNM]; Dan P. McAdams, The Mind of Donald Trump, THE ATLANTIC (June 2016), https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/the-mind-of-donald-trump/480771/ [https://perma.cc/ZD36ENXP].
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ing disorder.” 20 The concern was not, however, a cleanly partisan one. Even his
supporters were nervous. Trump’s temperament was their single biggest worry. 21 That rare bipartisan convergence evidenced a baseline, shared belief that
some clusters of durable personal traits make individuals more or less suited to
particular positions of authority. These clusters are distinct from other qualifications for those positions of authority, such as adequate and relevant training.
They also are distinct from the ideological orientations that different segments
of the populace may prefer or not prefer when filling those positions. Whether
we are talking about judges or other government officials, then, we are trying
to capture something elemental about the human being. In order to predict how
he or she will act in a specific set of circumstances, we are trying to get a sense
of what he or she is like. 22
So far, so good. But this episode in American political history further
demonstrates how elastic the concept of temperament can be. During the 2016
campaign, Trump declared temperament to be his “strongest asset, maybe by
far.” 23 He characterized his temperament as a “winning” one, that is, consisting
of knowing “how to win”—not a quality commonly seen on any temperamental
inventory, diverse though they are. 24 In a statement with strong parallels to the
judicial context, a prominent commentator observed that “a president’s temperament is his most important quality and it is the hardest to measure in the candidates.” 25 Like “leadership,” “character,” and “values,” the concept—whether
applied to executive officials or judges—can “get shapeless pretty fast.” 26
20
Peter Wehner, Opinion, Why I Cannot Fall in Line Behind Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/opinion/sunday/why-i-cannot-fall-in-line-behind-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/CD39-P3JV]; see Adam Howard, Trump’s Mental State Is Becoming a Campaign
Talking Point, NBC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-s-mentalstate-becoming-campaign-talking-point-n621556 [https://perma.cc/LJS7-GVXZ].
21
According to a pre-election Pew survey, 34% of Trump supporters worried about his temperament. PEW RESEARCH CTR., IN THEIR OWN WORDS: WHY VOTERS SUPPORT AND HAVE CONCERNS
ABOUT—CLINTON AND TRUMP 2 (2016), https://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/
4/2016/09/09-21-16-campaign-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/J94W-7D65]. One opined that Trump was
like a “temperamental child saying anything in an attempt to get what he wants.” Id. Clinton supporters voiced no concerns about her temperament; their greatest worry was trustworthiness. Id. at 3.
22
CHARLES S. CARVER & MICHAEL F. SCHEIER, PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY 37 (7th ed.
2012).
23
Katie Zezima, Trump: My Strongest Asset ‘Is My Temperament,’ WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/09/27/trump-my-strongest-asset-is-mytemperament/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.64b851b72659 [https://perma.cc/948E-2ZQ5].
24
Id.
25
John Dickerson, How to Measure for a President, SLATE (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/politics/features/2012/how_to_measure_a_president_/how_to_measure_
for_a_president_temperament_is_a_president_s_most_important_attribute_and_the_hardest_to_
examine_.html [https://perma.cc/23M3-PMDJ] (explaining how words like temperament are “used by
politicians to critique their opponent without having to explain exactly what they mean”). It is a fair
question whether we require different temperaments of executive officials and judges. Although Doris
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Our concept of judicial temperament need not, and should not, remain
simultaneously so vital and yet so shapeless. This Article seeks to articulate
judicial temperament’s theoretical core and, in so doing, to fundamentally reorient how we think and talk about it. It posits that, because judicial temperament is a psychological construct, we ought to use psychology to understand it.
The psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament offered by this Article proposes that we ought to think of judicial temperament as a deep-seated, relatively stable set of specific personal traits—separable from intellect, training, and
ideology—that, in dialectic with judicial environments and the predictable demands of judging, drive behaviors that we may deem desirable or undesirable
according to the dominant normative expectations of our era. This way of
thinking about judicial temperament synergizes with how our sister discipline
of psychology conceptualizes human temperament. The psycho-legal theory
offers a sharper notion of how judicial temperament operates structurally and
of what it consists substantively.
This Article represents the first substantial scholarly exploration of judicial temperament, and the first of any length to recruit psychological insights.
Part I offers an overview of extant notions of judicial temperament, particularly the deep-rooted idea that the good judge is characterized, in part, by highly
personal, non-intellectual traits. 27 It echoes a philosophical tradition in which
moral virtues—defined by Aristotle as temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude—are distinguished from intellectual ones. 28 Indeed, some centuries after
Aristotle, Senator Lindsey Graham, when questioning Neil Gorsuch at his confirmation hearing for the Tenth Circuit, emphasized that “being a judge is more
than being smart.” 29 To predict who will be a good judge, “you have got to understand people underneath.” 30 This Part examines how we have attempted to
specify both the desired qualities that lie underneath and the behaviors those
Kearns Goodwin, for one, suggests there is something unique about presidential temperament, her
account bears striking overlap with commonly cited aspects of judicial temperament. Peter Grier,
Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, and the Question of Temperament, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept.
22, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2016/0922/Donald-Trump-Hillary-Clinton-andthe-question-of-temperament [https://perma.cc/D7JP-YZ9N] (quoting Kearns Goodwin and other
historians as listing humility, empathy, and patience; liking people; resilience; and not being disposed
to “wallow[] in anger or resentment” as “basic qualities” for a president, ones “that are useful in a
wide range of situations”).
26
Dickerson, supra note 25.
27
See infra notes 42–105 and accompanying text.
28
See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (W.D. Ross trans., Batoche Books 1999) (c.
384 B.C.E.).
29
Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 36 (2006) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearings II], https://www.congress.gov/109/
chrg/shrg32199/CHRG-109shrg32199.pdf [https://perma.cc/45GL-G69G] (statement of Sen. Graham).
30
Id.
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qualities are thought to promote. Though variance abounds, temperament generally is understood to manifest in patience, level-headedness in challenging
moments, and being a good colleague; to be rooted in dispositions such as
compassion and open-mindedness; and to be separable from other aspects of
judicial competence—like intelligence—and from other influences on judicial
behavior—like ideology. 31 These core ideas are essentially correct, though incomplete, inadequately specified, and undertheorized.
The psychological literature on temperament and personality, particularly
the foundational work of Jerome Kagan, is enormously helpful in remedying
these defects. 32 In psychology, temperament refers to trait-level individual difSee infra notes 106–273 and accompanying text; see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., COMPETENCIES
33 (2018) (defining judicial temperament narrowly as the “quality of
acting with dignity and humility and treating others with courtesy and discretion, even in challenging
situations,” and detailing its outcomes).
32
An important point of nomenclature here deserves mention. When this Article refers to psychological concepts of temperament, it means to embrace that discipline’s study of trait-level individual
differences and their implications in adults. Although the psychological literature traditionally has
distinguished between such phenomena in child development—historically labeled temperament—
and adult manifestations of those phenomena—historically labeled personality—this theoretical and
linguistic divide is declining. See Mary K. Rothbart, Advances in Temperament: History, Concepts,
and Measures, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT 3, 9 (Marcel Zentner & Rebecca L. Shiner eds.,
2012) (“In recent years, concepts of temperament and personality in adulthood and childhood have
increasingly come together . . . .”); Marcel Zentner & Rebecca L. Shiner, Fifty Years of Progress in
Temperament Research: A Synthesis of Major Themes, Findings, and Challenges and a Look Forward, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra, at 673, 673 (“Placing research on the heritability and
biology of adult temperament and the study of child temperament under one roof galvanized the field
and helped to forge the identity of the field of temperament as it is known today.”). Further, adult
temperament is now understood to refer to a smaller and more deeply-rooted set of intrapersonal attributes than does personality. See Jaap J.A. Denissen et al., Personality Development Across the Life
Span, in WILEY-BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 77, 77–84 (Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic et al. eds., 2011) (exploring the overlap between research on personality and temperament).
Further, this Article does not seek to examine psychological, psychiatric, or physical disorders.
Temperament, like many other factors, does have some bearing on clinical disorders; it may, for example, moderate responses to adversity, or be associated with greater risk of particular psychopathologies. Liliana J. Lengua & Theodore D. Wachs, Temperament and Risk: Resilient and Vulnerable
Responses to Adversity, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra, at 519, 519–21. The complicated
interplay of temperament and clinical disorder falls outside the reach of this Article, and is nowhere
near a straight-enough line to require the theory proposed herein to account for it. The important issues associated with physical and mental illness in the judiciary is the focus of a relatively new move
toward supporting judicial wellness, itself worthy of deeper study. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N,
COMMISSION ON LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, JUDGES HELPING JUDGES, THE JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE INITIATIVE: RESOURCES & EDUCATION 44–61 (2010) [hereinafter JUDGES HELPING JUDGES]
(providing information on good judicial mental health and resources to support it); U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, A WELLNESS GUIDE FOR JUDGES OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURTS
(2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/lawyer_assistance/ls_colap_
2015_Wellness_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4PS-F4UV] (addressing challenges to the mental health
of judges and providing strategies to improve it).
31

FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES
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ferences that underlie the ways in which different people react to, and cope
with, similar situations. 33 Part II sets forth two fundamental insights from that
literature that undergird a new psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament. 34
First, temperament has a structural component. Temperament constrains
how any given person may act, and is an important determinant of behavior,
particularly behavior when under stress. Because of these structural attributes,
a judge’s core temperamental traits are relatively hard to shake, and behavior
in highly stressful situations is at least somewhat (and perhaps highly) diagnostic of those traits. Temperament’s structure, however, is complex and interactional. Its implications are co-determined by the unique mix of traits within a
person, the attributes of the environment within which the person is asked to
function, and the interaction between the two. Therefore, rather than conceptualize judicial temperament as a unitary quality that one has or does not have, as
we generally have done, we should recognize a range of judicial temperaments
that will fit poorly or well with particular judicial assignments.
Second, temperament has a substantive component, consisting of stable
patterns of emotional experience and self-regulation. When we talk about judicial temperament, then, we ought to be talking largely about emotion—both
the emotional traits that sit at a person’s core and the behaviors those traits
promote. The psycho-legal theory proposes that the substantive underpinnings
of a desirable judicial temperament are, first, stable tendencies toward positive,
prosocial emotions, dispositional kindness, and low levels of habitual negative
emotionality, and, second, relatively high levels of skill with emotional regulation. 35 The theory does not call for perfection, and not every judge is expected
to have an ideal temperament. Every judge should, however, clear the baseline
conditions of being relatively low in negative emotionality, possessing at least
some demonstrable trait kindness, and having at least moderate levels of emotional regulation.
This psycho-legal theory articulates the core of what we ought to talk
about when we talk about judicial temperament. It has wide-reaching implications. It can shape mechanisms of judicial selection, training, support, and discipline, not just for the U.S. Supreme Court—a small target that draws enormous attention—but for the tens of thousands of lower court judges in federal,
state, municipal, and administrative courts across the country. 36 It can inform

Rothbart, supra note 32, at 3.
See infra notes 106–273 and accompanying text.
35
See infra notes 106–273 and accompanying text.
36
RON MALEGA & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION,
2011, at 1 (Nov. 2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco11.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAQ9-3S3Y]
(finding there to be over 27,000 state court judges); Biographical Directory of Article III Federal
33
34
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how we sort people into the specific judicial roles in which they are most likely to thrive. It would also allow us to construct and support environments that
maximize judges’ chances of thriving, and minimize their chances of failure,
given their expected range of temperaments. 37
The psycho-legal theory also presents particular dangers. If the primary
vice of extant accounts is indeterminacy, the primary vice of this one may be
overdeterminacy. There is nothing in this new account that guarantees that
shortcoming, but there is reason to worry that it may manifest. Part III concretizes those dangers by showing the ways in which our human drive to categorize ourselves has manifested in analytical schemes ranging from silly to evil
to clumsy. 38 After cautioning against such approaches, Part III invites robust,
empirically-grounded exploration of the many ways in which the psycho-legal
theory of judicial temperament could be used. 39 Part III argues further that the
psycho-legal theory explains why commitment to diversity and equality should
not be regarded as factors of temperament, though influential accounts cast
them as such. 40 Such commitments should instead be recognized as independent requirements for judicial service in a diverse, democratic society.
Finally, Part IV returns to the Kavanaugh nomination, presenting it as a
lost opportunity for productive dialogue on the nature of judicial temperament.
It further explores how the psycho-legal theory could have provided a sound,
disciplined frame within which to have that dialogue. 41
This Article concludes by positing that the psycho-legal theory gets to the
heart of the matter. It both explains what judicial temperament is and predicts
how it may be assessed and, perhaps, improved.
I. WHAT WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT WHEN WE HAVE
TALKED ABOUT JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT
Temperament, perhaps most critically, affects how judges decide cases. 42

The core judicial mission—to effectively decide cases—encompasses a
wide range of behaviors. Most obviously, it includes the work of making legal
Judges, 1789–Present, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.cc/
QL5N-6XUK] (listing over 1,200 Article III federal judges).
37
Given the psycho-legal theory’s applicability to all these pivotal moments, this Article uses the
term “judge” to signify both persons who already are serving in a judicial role and those who are seeking judicial office.
38
See infra notes 274–311 and accompanying text.
39
See infra notes 278–285 and accompanying text.
40
See infra notes 286–311 and accompanying text.
41
See infra notes 312–325 and accompanying text.
42
Sutton, supra note 12, at 875.
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and factual decisions—decisions about what the law is or what it requires in a
given situation, how to exercise discretion, how broadly or narrowly to define
legal questions, what versions of reality to credit, what level of deference to
give other institutional actors, and so on. Although these aspects of judging
draw the lion’s share of scholarly attention, other aspects of judicial behavior
are also important, both because they have independent value and because they
are closely intertwined with that decision making. How judges interact with
the public, lawyers, litigants, jurors, witnesses, court staff, and one another, for
instance, matters. Judges also act as colleagues, employees, employers, and
supervisors. They may embrace the role of court manager, civic role model, or
public intellectual.
Judicial temperament speaks to this broader understanding of what judges
do. 43 Though it has implications for legal and factual decision making, it concerns itself not with whether a judge is intellectually capable of parsing a statute, or the interpretive philosophy she will employ in doing so, but rather with
how she will handle the job’s inherent challenges and how she will treat people
along the way. As Supreme Court Chief Justice Roberts has written, excellence
in judging entails “long hours, exacting skill, and intense devotion—while
promising high stress, solitary confinement, and guaranteed criticism.” 44 A
person can have extraordinary intellect and training and yet be a miserable
failure at handling these parameters of judicial life. 45 That failure may manifest
itself as an inability to carry out the decisional tasks of which she is capable—
for example, routinely denying meritorious objections because she is distracted
from, irritated with, or disinterested in what attorneys have to say. Failure may
also rear its head in callousness, arrogance, burnout, displays of disrespect—
both to the public and to judicial colleagues—and psychological and physical
ailments. 46
43
See MARLA N. GREENSTEIN, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS 73 (2d ed., 2004), http://www.judicialselection.com/uploads/documents/Hand

book_for_Judicial_Nominating_Co_C46CEF0C61755.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5NR-SV67] (“The
judge’s job includes contact with lawyers, members of the public and court employees and requires an
inordinate amount of an elusive quality called judicial temperament.”).
44
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2016 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
8 (2016), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2016year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8DLT-Q7KN]. Although Chief Justice Roberts was speaking specifically of U.S. District Judges, the
sentiment is equally true of appellate judging, though some sources of stress are different. See infra
notes 158–163 and accompanying text.
45
Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection by the Numbers, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1197, 1205–06
(2005) (stating that not all judges are able to “handle the intense pressures that come with the responsibilities” of the position).
46
See JUDGES HELPING JUDGES, supra note 32, at 1–2, 44–57, 65, 70 (presenting range of problems that impaired judges can face, including mental health disorders and burnout, some of which
may manifest in intemperate actions and misconduct).
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Our enduring concern with judicial temperament reflects a shared notion
that the non-intellectual aspects of a judge’s personal makeup matter. They
may promote or hinder judges’ ability to carry out the basic functions of their
jobs. 47 They may promote or hinder the collegiality on which court functioning
depends—something particularly important in the appellate courts, in which all
decision making is a joint enterprise. 48 They may promote or hinder judges’
longevity and well-being—independently worthy goals, but also important to
preserving the investment society sinks into judges and the hard, disruptive
work required to discipline or remove them. 49 They may promote or hinder
judges’ ability to grasp and care about the stories behind, and impacts of, their
work. They may promote or hinder the public displays of respect and concern
that, as the procedural justice literature shows, are critical to public confidence
in the courts. 50
In short, temperament has real consequences for judges’ well-being, the
quality of justice in individual cases, the soundness of the judiciary as an insti47
See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at v (stating that temperament is “essential for successful performance”).
48
See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1639, 1639–40 (2003) (explaining the importance of collegiality in an appellate court). Frayed
collegial bonds were starkly exposed in former Judge Richard Posner’s recent, highly contentious
departure from the Seventh Circuit. In a hastily self-published book, Posner detailed his disputes with
colleagues and—ignoring an ethics command that he not do so—included internal memos and emails,
annotated by his comments. Patricia Manson, Posner Says Friction on 7th Circuit Bench Led to His
Retirement, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/archives/
2017/09/06/posner-bench-friction-9-6-17 [https://perma.cc/P66E-UYME]; Joe Patrice, The Seventh
Circuit’s War with Judge Posner Really Escalated Quickly, ABOVE THE LAW (Oct. 31, 2017),
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/10/the-seventh-circuits-war-with-judge-posner-really-escalatedquickly/ [https://perma.cc/49AQ-JPAJ]; Matthew Stiegler, Posner’s New Book Is Bananas, but You
Might Want It Anyway, CA3BLOG (Sept. 18, 2017), http://ca3blog.com/judges/posners-new-book-isbananas-but-you-might-want-it-anyway/ [https://perma.cc/9TB9-SXB7].
49
See Terry A. Maroney & James J. Gross, The Ideal of the Dispassionate Judge: An Emotion
Regulation Perspective, 6 EMOTION REV. 142, 142 (2014) (explaining how effective tools for emotion
regulation can benefit judges’ ability to manage work); see also Douglas Keith, Impeachment and
Removal of Judges: An Explainer, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.
brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/impeachment-and-removal-judges-explainer [https://
perma.cc/HTY4-M2FZ] (overviewing state and federal removal processes and stating that “[i]mpeachment of judges is rare, and removal is rarer still”); Methods of Judicial Selection: Removal of
Judges, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS., http://www.judicialselection.com/judicial_selection/
methods/removal_of_judges.cfm?state [https://perma.cc/92SD-XFT9] (detailing state-by-state requirements for judicial removal).
50
See Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4, 6 (2008) (finding that a public perception of procedural fairness—created by
letting people’s voices be heard, showing neutrality, treating people respectfully, and inspiring trust—
generates positive emotions in the public and increases voluntary cooperation and compliance with
legal authorities); Kristina Murphy & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice and Compliance Behaviour: The
Mediating Role of Emotions, 38 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 652, 652 (2008) (showing how procedural
justice changes peoples’ emotions, which in turn affects their compliance behaviors).
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tution, and the level of respect with which the public regards that institution.
Hence the high stakes, and hence the intolerability of leaving the construct so
ill-defined.
This Part first elucidates what concepts are captured in the notion of temperament. 51 Section B then highlights concepts that fall outside of this category, and therefore should not be regarded as temperamental. 52 Section C explores how temperament is discussed in the psychological and legal fields, respectively, and finds a common ground between the two. 53
A. What Judicial Temperament (Arguably) Is
The construct of judicial temperament is ill-defined, but not entirely undefined. The few extant scholarly treatments offer some theoretical insights,
though they tend not to explain how they ought to be operationalized. 54 In contrast, judicial selection guidelines and processes, codes of conduct, performance evaluation standards, and disciplinary norms—together delineating the
spaces within which (and criteria by which) temperament is used to initiate,
guide, measure, and terminate judges’ careers—largely lack a theoretical basis. 55 Nevertheless, some value may be teased out of extant accounts.
When scholars have talked about judicial temperament conceptually, they
generally invoke four basic structural ideas. First, temperament is located in
the person, not the office. Second, temperament drives the behavior of that
person in that office. Put together, these ideas yield the central assumption that
a judge with temperament x will, in environment y, act predictably with behavior z but not behavior q. We look under the robe because how a person is conSee infra notes 54–69 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 70–100 and accompanying text.
53
See infra notes 101–105 and accompanying text.
54
See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 2, at 2; Ross, Functions, Roles, and Duties, supra note 12, at 64–
65; Ross, Questioning, supra note 5, at 129–32; Yackle, supra note 7, at 309–10; Sutton, supra note
12, at 875.
55
See HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 3 (providing general criteria for temperament without
any support); Marla N. Greenstein et al., Improving the Judiciary Through Performance Evaluations,
in THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 225, 233–36 (Gordon M. Griller & E.
Keith Stott, Jr eds., 7th ed. 2001) (suggesting judicial temperament as a tool for assessment, but failing to explain what it is); Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of
Judicial Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1070 (2002) (providing only a sentence to define judicial temperament). For a comprehensive overview of the element of temperament
in performance evaluation, see Judicial Performance Evaluation, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
THE AM. LEGAL SYS., https://iaals.du.edu/projects/judicial-performance-evaluation [https://perma.cc/
P6SB-AXWZ]. Sometimes the construct is invoked and left completely undefined, as in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. See James T. Hill, Achieving Transparency in the Military Panel Selection
Process with the Preselection Method, 205 MIL. L. REV. 117, 137 (2010) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2)
(2006), which requires the convening authority to consider judicial temperament but provides no further explanation).
51
52
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structed determines how he or she will function. Given this focus on predicting
function, the third idea is that judicial temperament is valued not as a freestanding virtue but instead because we believe it produces desirable behaviors
in the daily work of judging. Fourth, temperament is thought to be conceptually separable from other desirable judicial qualities, such as adequate legal
training, and from other influences on behavior, such as ideological commitments. These foundational ideas are, as it turns out, nicely in line with the psychological literature, as Part II.A demonstrates. 56 The problem with the extant
literature is that it inadequately articulates these foundational ideas about temperament’s structure; further, it does not ground them in the relevant psychology.
At the substantive level, distilling extant treatments of judicial temperament reveals that certain characteristics repeatedly surface in the construct’s
taxonomies. One such quality is compassion, an emotional response to perceiving and caring about another’s distress. 57 Another commonly cited trait is
patience, judged by the ability to be even-tempered and exercise restraint in
trying situations. 58 Dignity also is mentioned with moderate frequency, as here:
See infra notes 110–127 and accompanying text.
C. Daniel Batson, Compassion, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE
SCIENCES 91, 91 (David Sanders & Klaus R. Scherer eds., 2009). A tendency to feel compassion is
the first quality emphasized by the influential ABA Standing Committee. HOW IT WORKS, supra note
11, at 3. The ABA Standing Committee evaluates the “integrity, professional competence and judicial
temperament” of every nominee for an Article III judgeship in the United States, as well as Article IV
appointments in the territories. See id.; see also ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, JUDICIAL RETENTION
SURVEYS: JUDGES ELIGIBLE FOR RETENTION IN 2014, TECHNICAL REPORT 8 (2014), http://www.
ajc.state.ak.us/retention/retent14/techrpt14.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7G3-RRRC] (using temperament as
a retention criterion, rated on a basis of “courtesy and freedom from arrogance” and a manifestation of
“human understanding and compassion”); AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION IN STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION STANDARDS 7 (2000) (prioritizing
compassion similarly); Alfini & Gable, supra note 12, at 704. Snapshot views of Senate Judiciary
Committee hearings on Article III appointments reflect a similar perspective. Nominees in a 1998
hearing, asked to explain their concept of judicial temperament, made consistent and specific mention
of compassion. Confirmation Hearings I, supra note 1, at 7, 267, 643. Even Chief Justice Roberts has
emphasized that a district judge must “temper[] firm and decisive judgment” with “compassion.”
ROBERTS, supra note 44, at 4.
58
GREENSTEIN, supra note 43, at 71. The ABA Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial Performance (ABA Performance Guidelines) define temperament as “patience . . . dignity and understanding,” a simple construction that gives that trait high prominence. AM. BAR ASS’N, SPECIAL COMM. ON
EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 15 (1985) (outlining a model approach to assessment of sitting judges); UTAH STATE
COURTS, supra note 11, at 19; Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. MIAMI. L.
REV. 159, 188 (1993) (referring to a proposed, but not adopted, definition of judicial temperament as
“dignity, sensitivity and understanding”); see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 33 (a judge
with good judicial temperament “[e]xhibits patience and exercises civility, courtesy, and tact in all
interactions”); HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 3; Gerhardt, supra note 45, at 1205 (“[A] district
judge may largely work alone in deciding cases but still needs a great deal of patience to sit through
long trials and other legal proceedings.”).
56
57
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“[t]o be dignified a judge must possess ‘quiet, tactful ways, and calm yet firm
assurance.’” 59 Confusingly, dignity sometimes is treated not as a trait but, rather, as an institutional image or value that is promoted by judges with a proper
set of traits. 60 Indeed, it is common for discussions of temperament to elide
lines between traits (for example, being a dignified person), the behaviors
promoted by those traits (acting in a dignified manner), and the values served
by those behaviors (promoting a positive image of the judiciary). 61 Similarly,
frequent invocations of demeanor capture not a trait so much as the multiple
ways in which a judge—through facial expressions, tone of voice, and bodily
movements—projects valued traits, including compassion, patience, and dignity, but also calm, respect, and humility. 62 Collegiality, another oft-named quality, similarly is described as both a “generous and respectful” attitude towards
one’s judicial fellows and the concrete actions by which that attitude is manifested. 63 Finally, three other qualities that appear to be both highly valued and
commonly regarded as temperamental are being open-minded, even-handed,
and committed to equality. 64
Beyond this (relatively) common core, extant accounts propose an array
of other traits and behaviors, such as humor, likeability, common sense,
59
GREENSTEIN, supra note 43, at 73 (quoting J. Bernard L. Sheintag, The Benjamin N. Cardozo
Lectures, The Personality of the Judge (1943), in THE PERSONALITY OF THE JUDGE 42 (1944)); FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 33.
60
The ABA Performance Guidelines invoke both uses, defining judicial temperament as consisting of personal dignity and cautioning that “a judge without good judicial temperament can do great
harm to the dignity of the position.” AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 58, at 15.
61
See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 58, at 15 (calling for judges to act in a dignified manner);
GREENSTEIN, supra note 43, at 73 (describing dignity as a trait); Burke & Leben, supra note 50, at 6–
7 (discussing dignity for its effect on judicial image).
62
See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 33 (describing the extent to which a judge
“[e]xhibits an even tone, a calm voice, and appropriate body language under pressure”); JUDICIARY
STATE OF HAW., JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE PROGRAM 2016 REPORT 4 (2016), http://www.courts.
state.hi.us/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/JP16REPT.pdf [https://perma.cc/9J5S-CDYX] (measuring
“comportment” by reference to courtesy, compassion, patience, and absence of bias and arrogance);
see also ARTHUR H. GARWIN ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 194–95 (3d ed. 2016) (construing Rule 2.8(B), a requirement that judges maintain a proper judicial demeanor, as a temperamental construct); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Regulating Discourtesy on the Bench: A Study in the Evolution of Judicial Independence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 497, 518 (2009) (discussing how judicial demeanor is seen as an indicator of judicial impartiality).
63
See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 25, 33 (providing behaviors and expected outcomes
associated with judicial collegiality); Gerhardt, supra note 45, at 1205–06 (emphasizing the importance of collegiality); Sutton, supra note 12, at 875 (reflecting the view that temperament includes
“being a generous and respectful colleague”).
64
See HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 3 (asking nominees be considered on “open-mindedness
. . . freedom from bias and commitment to equal justice”); Gerhardt, supra note 45, at 1205–06;
Goldman, supra note 7, at 741 (describing how a judge should be fair and impartial when administering justice).
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warmth, and willingness to work hard. 65 The diversity of this array reminds us
of how elusive the concept of judicial temperament remains. Further, it is at
this juncture that scholars tend to fall into despair, and end up characterizing
the construct as so “vague,” 66 “unruly,” 67 and “capable of so many definitions” 68 that “it is difficult to conceive of how so amorphous a criterion could
be made more precise.” 69
B. What Judicial Temperament (Arguably) Is Not
One strategy for countering such despair is to define the elusive construct
via contrast with its supposed opposite. As the Utah application for judicial
office states, “Judicial temperament is a quality which is not easily identifiable,
but . . . [i]ts absence can usually be fairly ascertained.” 70
One rare (if abbreviated) scholarly treatment of temperament, offered by
Lawrence Solum, explicitly reasons in this fashion. Grounding his claims in
Aristotelean virtue ethics, Solum identifies the foundational judicial virtues—
that is, dispositions of mind or will that underlie just decisions—as temperance, courage, good temper, intelligence, wisdom, and justice. 71 It being easier
to identify consensus on traits and behaviors we do not want in our judges, he
draws out the nature of each judicial virtue by contrast with an opposing
vice. 72 Solum maps the contemporary concept of judicial temperament onto the
virtue of “good temper,” or proates, which he juxtaposes with the vice of excessive anger. He is not uniformly anti-anger, unlike many Stoics. 73 He urges
instead that proates requires “proportionate anger,” which “alerts us to wrongs
and motivates us to respond to them” but avoids misguided or outsized displays. 74 Amusingly, Solum illustrates this virtue by way of Star Trek. He proposes that Mr. Spock (were he a judge) would react “with equanimity to even
the most severe courtroom provocations,” but is too logical and cold, while Dr.
McCoy is “hot-tempered,” and “we imagine him flying off the handle” when
provoked. 75 Captain Kirk is just right, however, by being both “appropriately
Ross, Questioning, supra note 5, at 130–33; Sutton, supra note 12, at 875.
Goldman, supra note 7, at 741.
67
Yackle, supra note 7, at 309.
68
Ross, Questioning, supra note 5, at 130.
69
Ross, Participation, supra note 15, at 65.
70
GREENSTEIN, supra note 43, at 93 (quoting the Utah Application for Judicial Office).
71
See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65 (2006) (exploring the
conceptual boundaries of justice in our legal system).
72
Laurence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365, 1368–76 (2005)
(discussing judicial vices that are universally disliked).
73
Id. at 1372.
74
Id. at 1373.
75
Id.
65
66
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outraged by bad behavior and injustice but nonetheless remaining ‘in control’
and responding in an appropriate manner.” 76 Solum thus isolates the virtue of
what I have called “righteous judicial anger.” 77 He treats it as the sum total of
good judicial temperament, conversely casting highly dysregulated displays of
anger as the essence of poor temperament. 78
Indeed, the psycho-legal theory concurs that dysregulated displays of anger are one reflection of a poor temperament, and the over-the-top variety contribute significantly to the initiation of judicial disciplinary proceedings. 79
Even a cursory examination of such disciplinary cases, however, shows Solum’s formulation to be unduly narrow. 80 Consider this example from New
York, in which a judge was censured on temperamental grounds for being angry, but also for being:
arrogant, dictatorial, demeaning, loud, and degrading, and [for] having attempted to frighten parties into settlement . . . . [T]he judge’s
conduct amounted to a lack of judicial temperament which manifested itself by shouting at parties, rudeness, abusive and bullying
behavior, and some instances of extremely high-handed conduct and
abuse of authority. 81
Other sources similarly reflect the view that broader indicators of poor temperament are “arrogance, impatience, pomposity, irascibility, arbitrariness or tyranny,” 82 “rudeness, nastiness, and arrogance,” 83 and use of contemptuous and
76

Id.
Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1250 (2012).
78
See Solum, supra note 72, at 1372–74 (identifying excessive anger as the crux of poor judicial
temperament, and asserting that all judges—trial and appellate—need to possess the appropriate anger
that characterizes “good temper”).
79
See GARWIN ET AL., supra note 62, at 206–14 (collecting examples of judges sanctioned for
“inappropriate expressions of anger,” including physical confrontations and yelling); Sharyn Roach
Anleu et al., The Emotional Dimension of Judging: Issues, Evidence, and Insights, 52 CT. REV. 60, 70
(2016) (analyzing examples of state disciplinary proceedings sparked by anger displays).
80
See generally Dodds v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 906 P.2d 1260, 1270 (Cal. 1995)
(explaining that the judge “repeatedly interrupt[ed] a litigant and yell[ed] angrily and without adequate provocation”); In re Sloop, 946 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. 2006) (removing a judge for repeated
displays of misconduct, including brandishing a firearm in the courtroom); In re Holien, 612 N.W.2d
789 (Iowa 2000) (“The depth and breadth of [the judge’s] hostilities must have touched every aspect
of her judicial services . . . . She has been like the proverbial bull in a china shop.”).
81
Disciplinary Action Against Judge on Ground of Abusive or Intemperate Language or Conduct
Toward Attorneys, Court Personnel, or Parties to or Witnesses in Actions, and the Like, 89 A.L.R. 4th
278 § 40 (1991).
82
GREENSTEIN, supra note 43, at 93 (quoting the Utah Application for Judicial Office).
83
Norman L. Greene, A Perspective on “Temper in the Court: A Forum on Judicial Civility,” 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709, 712, 716–17 (1996) (pointing out that “blatant rudeness, nastiness, and
arrogance . . . are well known to people who are frequently in the courts”).
77
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insulting language. 84 Anger alone does not explain such attitudes and behaviors. 85 Although anger is an important element of both the virtue of temperament and the vice of its opposite, it is not the only element. 86
That being said, Solum’s account is welcome in that it correctly identifies
differential propensities toward anger and its expression as an element of judicial temperament. He also nicely distinguishes between episodic anger and
underlying dispositions. Rather than criticize or praise the handling of any given conflict on the Starship Enterprise, Solum invites us to focus on the characters’ enduring qualities as a means to predict how they will handle conflict. As
Part II.B. explains, this distinction is critical. 87 Even the U.S. Supreme Court
has opined that good judges can fly off the handle at times, and that although
such instances are unfortunate, they do not necessarily reveal a general lack of
fitness. 88 Similarly, even though disciplinary actions sometimes are triggered
by one extreme incident, they far more frequently involve a pattern of conduct. 89 Judges who routinely explode, engage in outsized power displays, demean others, and appear resistant to change seem so obviously “intemperate”
that all can agree that, whatever judicial temperament is, they don’t have it.90
Identifying the foil, these examples show, is one way—if an imperfect one—to
move closer to a shared concept of judicial temperament.
A second approach to clarifying temperament’s arguably elusive nature is
to identify qualities orthogonal, not oppositional, to it. For example, Solum
explicitly positions temperament as just one of a number of judicial virtues. 91
The conceptual work of separation requires boundary delineation. Indeed, no
account imagines temperament as the only ingredient in judicial fitness. The
ABA Standing Committee, for example, draws a sharp line between temperament and two other categories of fitness: integrity, which it defines as “character,” “reputation,” “industry and diligence,” and professional competence, or
“intellectual capacity, judgment, writing and analytic abilities, [legal] knowledge

84
Confirmation Hearings I, supra note 1, at 667 (statement of Sen. Biden cautioning federal
nominees not to be “arrogant,” “officious,” or “discourteous”); Roach Anleu et al., supra note 79, at
66–69.
85
See infra notes 164–273 and accompanying text.
86
See infra notes 174–215 and accompanying text.
87
See infra notes 128–163 and accompanying text.
88
Maroney, supra note 77, at 1236 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56
(1994)) (describing such lapses as within the “bounds of what imperfect men and women . . . display”).
89
See GARWIN ET AL., supra note 62, at 74, 84–85 (noting that sanctions for failures of temperament, including rude or hostile behavior, generally follow a pattern of similar conduct).
90
Email from Alexander Boni-Saenz, supra note 14.
91
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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. . . and . . . professional experience.” 92 A good judge, in the ABA account,
needs all three. Under the psycho-legal theory, too, such desirable judicial
qualities also are properly considered non-temperamental. 93
The ABA Standing Committee also disclaims any consideration of a
“nominee’s philosophy, political affiliation or ideology.” 94 That disclaimer reflects a belief—or at least the need to espouse a belief—that a judge with integrity, professional competence, and a proper temperament can be a good
judge, no matter her politics, declarative beliefs, or approach to judging. This
is not a perspective uniformly espoused. 95 The plausibility of such a separation, though, may be seen by contrasting the late Justice Scalia with his successor, Justice Gorsuch. The two are similar with regard to judicial philosophy
and ideology, but although many over the years have agreed with Scalia’s disparaging view of his own temperament, 96 Gorsuch drew widespread praise on
that count during his confirmation proceedings. 97 Indeed, one commentator
dubbed him “Scalia without the scowl,” and quipped that “Trump’s nominee
has the ideology without the temper.” 98 To be sure, this praise of Gorsuch’s
temperament suffered from the vice of vagueness, and more specific assess92
HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 3. See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31 (dividing competencies into knowledge, skills, and attributes, with temperament noted as one such attribute).
93
See infra notes 274–311 and accompanying text.
94
HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 9.
95
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
619, 629 (2003) (“The former argument, that a person’s ideology is unlikely to affect performance in
office, is impossible to sustain.”); Charles E. Schumer, Opinion, Judging by Ideology, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/26/opinion/judging-by-ideology.html [https://
perma.cc/6LNR-76HE] (calling for a pragmatic approach to judicial selection that considers ideology); infra notes 278–285 and accompanying text.
96
See Maroney, supra note 77, at 1245–46 (describing accounts of the late Justice’s temperament).
97
The hearing transcripts from Justice Gorsuch’s confirmation to the Tenth Circuit show few
references to temperament, and those that do appear are typically conclusory. See Confirmation Hearings II, supra note 29, at 2 (statement of Sen. Allard) (stating that Gorsuch “possesses the temperament befitting an appellate judge”).
98
Andrew Cohen, Neil Gorsuch: Scalia Without the Scowl, MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/01/31/neil-gorsuch-scalia-without-the-scowl [https://perma.
cc/CUZ2-UY35]; see Neal K. Katyal, Opinion, Why Liberals Should Back Neil Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/opinion/why-liberals-should-back-neil-gorsuch.
html [https://perma.cc/4NTM-VB89] (attributing to Justice Gorsuch “a temperament that suits the
nation’s highest court”); David Lawler, Neil Gorsuch: Who Is Donald Trump’s US Supreme Court
Nominee?, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/who-is-supremecourt-nominee-neil-gorsuch/ [https://perma.cc/GH9J-8X8H] (“He is well respected by his colleagues
in the judiciary and does not share Scalia’s fiery temperament.”); David G. Savage, Scalia’s Views
Mixed with Kennedy’s Style: Meet Neil Gorsuch, Trump’s Pick for the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
31, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-gorsuch-supreme-court-20170131-story.html
[https://perma.cc/837P-AXEP] (referencing his “superb” temperament).
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ments generally focused only on his calm and pleasant demeanor—just one
relevant factor. 99 The example nonetheless supports an important foundational
idea, also supported by the psycho-legal theory: temperament is not everything
we look for in a judge, and it operates independently from other qualities, both
those we seek (like adequate legal training) and those we may commit to disregard (such as politics). The psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament,
however, parts ways with the ABA example in one particular way, namely, by
identifying commitment to equality as a non-temperamental, ideological aspect
of judicial fitness. 100
C. We (Sort of) Speak the Same Language When We
Talk About Judicial Temperament
As this distillation reveals, it is possible to excavate at least some common core in how we talk about judicial temperament. Consensus, however,
should not be overstated. Even when taking a relatively focused view of highvalue traits and behaviors (like compassion and displays of patience) and lowvalue traits and behaviors (like anger and aggression), extant accounts are unclear as to whether judicial temperament serves only to promote procedural
justice values, collegiality, and the like, or whether, and to what degree, it also
implicates substantive decision making. 101 A highly elastic construct also
leaves much room for conceptual slippage, subterfuge, and bromides, and
thereby invites criticisms that are hard to counter except by resort to counterassertions equally devoid of content. 102 Moreover, not all agree that the sort of
99
See Cohen, supra note 98 (referring to Justice Gorsuch as “affable” and “measured”); Savage,
supra note 98 (citing his “polite, congenial manner”); see also Katyal, supra note 98 (praising Justice
Gorsuch’s temperament with no elaboration or detail).
100
See infra notes 274–311 and accompanying text.
101
See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 2, at 6–7 (claiming temperament affects every aspect of judging,
but including in the construct virtually every factor that could have such an effect, including jurisprudential philosophy); Jeffrey Rosen, The Supreme Court: Judicial Temperament and the Democratic
Ideal, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 10–11 (2007) (exploring the interaction of judicial temperament and
“success,” specifically emphasizing judicial humility); Yackle, supra note 7, at 309 (stating that temperament might refer to “prudence” or “Solomanic justice”); Byron Holz, Note, Chaos Worth Having:
Irreducible Complexity and Pragmatic Jurisprudence, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 303, 304 (2006)
(using temperament as a synonym for positivist, pragmatic, and nominalist judging styles).
102
Gerhardt, supra note 45, at 1206 (explaining how such accusations are hard to answer because
“[e]mpirically demonstrating excellent judicial temperament or collegiality is not easy”). Take the
1999 nomination of Ted Stewart to the District of Utah. Political opponents claimed that he had “little
or no judicial temperament.” Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 195 (1999), https://hdl.handle.net/2027/ien.35556032003824 [https://
perma.cc/YVF7-DDNX]. Stewart’s defenders fought back with verbiage simultaneously vociferous
and conclusory, branding the allegation “utterly false and nonsense.” Id. at 197. Letters submitted on
his behalf characterized his temperament as excellent, outstanding, good, abundant, mild, or—most
commonly—as simply existing, as in he seems to “possess a judicial temperament.” Id. at 206. Stew-
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temperament captured by the above distillation is necessary for one to be a
good judge, or even a great one. During the debates over Kavanaugh’s nomination, one commenter wrote that many of the most highly regarded U.S. Supreme Court Justices “had disastrously bad, highly unjudicial temperaments,”
as they were “nasty, vindictive, backbiting, ambitious and partisan” in addition
to nurturing animosities and taking every conflict personally. 103 The argued
point is not that bad temperament is a good thing, but rather that a judge with a
concededly bad temperament could still be great if he or she brings sufficient
other value to the bench. 104
We thus still are left with a version of the question once asked of Justice
Scalia: is there such a thing as an ideal judicial temperament, and if so, what is
it, what does it do, and why do we care? As to each aspect of this question, we
now have a stronger sense of where core instincts lie—an important analytic
step forward. But these core instincts are not doing the work we expect of
them. They have not gelled into a common understanding, based on sound theory, capable of being operationalized. As the following Part demonstrates,
folding these core instincts into a construct grounded in psychology both buttresses and complicates—and, ultimately, clarifies—what we should talk about
when we talk about judicial temperament. 105
II. THE PSYCHO-LEGAL THEORY OF JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT
Psychological theory and research provide a disciplined lens through
which to understand humans’ interpersonal differences—the major psychological qualities that distinguish one person from another—and intrapersonal
functioning—the ways in which those qualities combine within any given person. 106 These are the core concerns of judicial temperament: how to discern a
given judge’s relevant traits, and how to separate those with desirable traits
from those without them. Proceeding from the baseline truth that judges are
art’s nomination was successful and he still sits on the bench. The exchanges around his hearing,
however, shed precisely no light on his temperament.
103
Noah Feldman, Opinion, Bad Temperament Alone Shouldn’t Sink Kavanaugh, CHI. TRIB. (Oct.
4, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-kavanaugh-temperamentsupreme-court-1005-20181004-story.html [https://perma.cc/47PU-HZYP].
104
Part II.B.3 takes up this idea in proposing that we can (and should) tolerate a range of temperaments given a range of judicial roles that will have differential fit with a judge’s combination of traits
and other qualities. The psycho-legal theory does propose that some judges’ temperament is so exceedingly poor as to render it unlikely that any combination of other virtues would justify judicial
office, but I render no opinion as to whether that was true as to the Justices on which Professor Feldman focuses.
105
See infra notes 106–273 and accompanying text.
106
See Nicole B. Barenbaum & David G. Winter, History of Modern Personality Theory and
Research, in HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY 3, 7 (Oliver P. John et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008) (outlining the
different approaches to personality research).
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human, this Part synchronizes fundamental psychological findings about human temperament with fundamental features of judging. The resulting psycholegal theory of judicial temperament represents an attempt to elucidate the extent to which judges’ personal traits are likely to influence their work-related
behaviors, and how; the specific traits that are most and least likely to promote
desired behaviors, and why; and how we collectively can create environments
that help judges achieve the best possible level of performance in light of their
temperamental baselines.
Section A of this Part encapsulates psychological research into temperament, which lays the groundwork for the psycho-legal theory. 107 Section B sets
forth that theory’s structural aspect—namely, the ways in which temperament
constrains the possible self, significantly drives behavior, and interacts with the
judge’s environment. 108 Section C sets forth the theory’s substantive formulation,
showing how particular trait-level patterns of emotional experience and selfregulation would be predicted to serve or disserve desired judicial behaviors. 109
A. The Psychology of Temperament: Foundational Principles
The psycho-legal theory rests on several foundational principles of developmental and personality psychology, principles synopsized here.
Though each person is unique, interpersonal differences and intrapersonal
functioning are not an endless series of one-offs. These aspects of our personhood sort into categories. For example, it is common in modern U.S. culture to
refer to one person as an introvert and another as an extrovert, and to understand that these rough categories—first—explain something about each person’s consistent way of relating to the world, and—second—demarcate an important distinction that tends to manifest in particular behaviors in similar situations. 110 This notion that humans can be sorted into such types has a long history in philosophy and medicine. The most familiar and enduring model of
temperament, articulated by Hippocrates and expanded by Galen, divides all of
humanity into four types—melancholic, choleric, sanguine, and phlegmatic—
according to purported admixtures of bodily fluids, or “humors.” 111 The eleSee infra notes 110–127 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 128–163 and accompanying text.
109
See infra notes 164–273 and accompanying text.
110
See Barenbaum & Winter, supra note 106, at 12–13 (exploring how personality psychologists
break down personality traits to predict behavior).
111
See JEROME KAGAN, GALEN’S PROPHECY: TEMPERAMENT IN HUMAN NATURE 2–5 (2018)
(expanding on Hippocrates’ bodily fluids approach); Rothbart, supra note 32, at 5–6 (describing Hippocrates’ approach). Galen’s types remain surprisingly familiar: according to his typology, an excess
of black bile makes the melancholic person moody and prone to fear and sorrow; excess yellow bile
makes the choleric person easily aroused and aggressive; excess blood makes the sanguine person
107
108
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gant simplicity of that model has continued to enjoy enormous cultural purchase, and has found particularly strong expression in the arts. 112
With the advent of psychology as an independent discipline over the last
century, and with its enormous flourishing in the last decades, however, our
understanding of temperamental traits has become far less rigid. 113 We now
think in terms of dimensions—that is, the idea that every person sits somewhere on a continuum for every known trait—rather than about fixed types of
persons. 114 Rather than describe any given person as “an introvert,” for example, we would instead characterize that person as having greater or lesser degrees of introversion. 115 The combination of many trait dimensions within a
given person creates a relatively stable, distinct behavioral-affective profile—a
kind of “temperament constellation.” 116 Certain constellations occur with
above-average frequency, and thus yield qualitatively meaningful categories of
persons that are more numerous and nuanced than the four Galenic types but
less varied than snowflakes. 117 These trait constellations interact with situations to produce behavior. 118 Some situations are relatively impervious to temperamental influence—virtually all humans will try to escape a bear attack—

personable, warm, and easygoing; and excess of phlegm makes the phlegmatic person calm and evenkeeled. KAGAN, supra, at 2–5.
112
See KAGAN, supra note 111, at 8 (noting Galenic temperament’s expression in statuary, novels,
music, and dance); see also Fred Kirshnit, Carl Nielsen, Symphony No. 2, “De Fire Temperamenter”
(The Four Temperaments), AM. SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA (Nov. 18, 2007), https://americansymphony.
org/symphony-no-2-de-fire-temperamenter-the-four-temperaments-op-16-1901-02/ [https://perma.
cc/98F3-N4N8] (praising a music piece about humors and temperament); Anna Winter, Thérèse
Raquin by Emile Zola, THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/books/
2010/aug/01/therese-raquin-emile-zola-review [https://perma.cc/B8UH-82HP] (reviewing a book that
incorporates humors); Durer’s Symbolism: Adam & Eve, THE CLARK (Nov. 14, 2010), https://www.
clarkart.edu/exhibitions/durer/content/symbolism-adam-eve.cfm [https://perma.cc/C2ZS-A5KT]
(finding representations of the four humors in a painting); The Four Temperaments, THE GEORGE
BALANCHINE TR., http://balanchine.com/the-four-temperaments/ [https://perma.cc/MV29-TKB9] (last
visited Apr. 8, 2020) (describing a ballet commissioned to represent the humors).
113
See Oliver P. John et al., Paradigm Shift to the Integrative Big Five Trait Taxonomy: History,
Measurement, and Conceptual Issues, in HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY, supra note 106, at 114, 116,
119 (showing the conceptual shift surrounding personality traits).
114
See CARVER & SCHEIER, supra note 22, at 14 (defining a type as a “distinct and discontinuous
categor[y]” of person whereas a trait is an individual characteristic—say, extraversion—within a person).
115
DIANA JOYCE, ESSENTIALS OF TEMPERAMENT ASSESSMENT 72–77 (Alan S. Kaufman &
Nadeen L. Kaufman eds., 2010); KAGAN, supra note 111, at xvii; Rothbart, supra note 32, at 6; see
infra note 127 (explaining differences between personality domains, such as introversion and extraversion, and temperamental dimensions).
116
Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 680, 682–84 (describing developments in psychology that
have shown trait constellations originate in genes and the brain, not the “humors”).
117
KAGAN, supra note 111, at 70–75.
118
Id.

2020]

Judicial Temperament

2109

although most situations—say, a cocktail party—allow for trait-driven behavioral variation. 119
The core temperamental traits—which, as the following Sections will explain, 120 have been identified as emotional reactivity and self-regulation—
emerge early in life, evidencing their heritability and biological basis. 121 One’s
environment, however, also plays a vital role. Temperament provides the
“building blocks that underlie development of individual differences in personality,” but constant interactions and life experiences result in an eventual
adult expression of that personality that is more complex and varied. 122 Temperament and personality thus are closely intertwined, the former forming a
particularly deep stratum of the latter. 123 Finally, adults display other distinguishing qualities generally understood to reside outside the orbit of temperament and personality. These include intelligence, learned skills, “acquired
knowledge, opinions, beliefs,” and “tolerance toward others,” or what we
might together call abilities and beliefs. 124
Thus, even in its more sophisticated modern iteration, science validates
humans’ persistent drive to categorize. It is, in fact, true that we all “have fairly
stable qualities (traits) that are displayed across many settings but are deeply
embedded in the person.” 125 Thus we go through our lives with “relatively enduring individual differences in the tendency to behave, think, and feel in certain ways.” 126
Each aspect of a person—temperament, personality, abilities, and beliefs—is implicated in the kind of judge he or she will be. Not all, however, are
equally implicated in the construct of judicial temperament. 127 Those inCARVER & SCHEIER, supra note 22, at 31–34 & 32 fig.4, 37.
See infra notes 164–273 and accompanying text.
121
KAGAN, supra note 111, at xiv, 40–42 (“Although folk theory is often at odds with evidence
from psychological research, in this case the community belief that [certain] traits emerge early and
are stable over time matches the scientific record.”); JEROME KAGAN & NANCY SNIDMAN, THE LONG
SHADOW OF TEMPERAMENT 5 (2004) (studying reactivity as a polarized trait).
122
See Rothbart, supra note 32, at 3, 12–14 (surveying the contextual aspects that shape peoples’
personality).
123
CARVER & SCHEIER, supra note 22, at 21–28; William Revelle & Klaus R. Scherer, Personality and Emotion, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note
57, at 304, 304–05 (noting that emotional predisposition has significant effects on one’s day-to-day
emotional experiences); Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 675. Precise demarcation of the boundary
between temperament and personality remains contested. See Marvin Zuckerman, Models of Adult
Temperament, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 41, 55–60 (mapping the various
approaches of using personality factors to conceptualize temperament).
124
KAGAN, supra note 111, at 77.
125
CARVER & SCHEIER, supra note 22, at 8.
126
Denissen, supra note 32, at 77.
127
It is not the ambition of this Article to present a full account of how personality shapes judges
and their behavior, nor could it be. To give a concrete example, it does not take on the important ques119
120
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trapersonal aspects regarded by psychologists as temperamental are the key to
understanding both the structure and the substance of the legal construct of
judicial temperament.
B. Structural Elements of Judicial Temperament
With these fundamentals in mind, this Section dives deeper into what
psychology teaches us about the structural elements of human temperament
and weaves those insights into the context of judges and judging. 128 In short,
psychology strongly validates the implicit structural assumption that a judge
with temperament x will, in environment y, tend to display certain behaviors
but not others. Psychological research both provides the imperative to make
that assumption explicit and reveals ways in which it should be refined.
1. Temperament Constrains the Possible Self
You all know you have a book on every judge in your district. You
lawyers sit down and you talk about so-and-so being a horse’s tail,
so-and-so being fair, so-and-so being a good person, a bad person,
courteous, discourteous, arrogant, humble . . . . [M]y plea to you all
is . . . [that] when the day is done and they talk about you, people
say, you know, he or she was a courteous, decent, kind judge. 129
Senator Biden’s plea, made to a group of judges awaiting confirmation, assumed that lawyers develop a highly particularized read on the judges before
whom they appear. That “book” will capture a judge’s core personal qualities
in a way that is both predictive of professional behaviors and unlikely to vary.
The temperament literature evokes the same idea, but with a different
metaphor: not a book but an envelope. An envelope, like a book, contains diverse content, but ultimately constrains. As Jerome Kagan and Nancy Snidman
explain, “each temperament creates an envelope of possible outcomes, with
tion regarding the level of narcissism that might render a judge unfit for any or some judicial positions. Nor does it take on personality traits, such as conscientiousness, that likely promote independent
fitness domains, such as professional competence. By carving out the realm of judicial temperament
and identifying the traits that most clearly underlie or frustrate its manifestation, this Article helps
clarify the boundaries of other relevant traits and tees up further exploration of their influence. See
infra Part III.A. See generally MATTHEW E.K. HALL, WHAT JUSTICES WANT: GOALS AND PERSONALITY ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2018) (providing one example of what a disciplined inquiry into
broader personality domains might look like). It is possible that, over time and with further research,
the psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament may expand beyond the building-blocks elements of
reactivity and regulation to encompass certain other adult personality traits that are closely tied to
those building blocks, worthy of separate attention, and yet still separable from other fitness domains.
128
See infra notes 128–163 and accompanying text.
129
Confirmation Hearings I, supra note 1, at 667 (statement of Sen. Biden).
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some more likely than others.” 130 They were speaking specifically to the constraining properties of early-emerging traits measurable in infants and small
children—for example, a tendency to react calmly to unexpected stimuli (a
“low-reactive” profile). There is no straight line from such traits to their adult
manifestations; initial temperamental profiles shape and are shaped by environment over time. Thus, “different life histories create different personalities
in children born with the same temperament.” 131 The range of possibility, however, is bounded by the starting point. In Kagan’s words:
[O]ne’s temperament imposes a restraint on the possible outcomes.
A low-reactive infant might become a trial lawyer, investment banker, navy pilot, or criminal, but it is unlikely that he will become a
frightened recluse. Condensed water vapor can, depending on local
conditions, form a white billowy cloud, a mackerel sky, or a dense
ground fog, but it cannot become an asteroid. 132
Temperament thus “eliminates many more possibilities than it determines.”133
Although people grow and change within their envelope of possibility, it is highly unlikely that they will exit that envelope entirely. Further, some forms of emotional and behavioral change—even if possible—will be far more difficult for
persons with a given temperamental envelope than they would be for others, as
they will require greater motivation, environmental support, and effort. 134
Temperament’s constraining properties are particularly relevant to adults.
An adult’s temperamental profile will reflect some continuity from earlier
stages in the life course. Not being able to predict at the front end which traits
will endure does not mean that none will. 135 Indeed, certain early-appearing
tendencies, such as positive emotionality, empathy, anger, irritability, and skill
with self-control, are particularly durable. 136 Such durability signals a temperamental constraint that may be particularly tough to shake. Further, an adult’s
envelope of possibility is smaller, and its contents more fixed, than it was in
childhood. Personality continues to develop throughout the entire life course,
even into old age, as do abilities and beliefs. Variability, however, tightens and

KAGAN & SNIDMAN, supra note 121, at 3.
Id.; see KAGAN, supra note 111, at xx–xxi, 36.
132
KAGAN & SNIDMAN, supra note 121, at 3.
133
Id. at 23, 197 (“The power of each infant temperamental bias lay in its ability to prevent the
development of a contrasting profile.”).
134
Id. at 29; see Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 688 (noting that there “is a certain inertia to
temperament,” and while people can develop in many ways “some ways are more likely than others”).
135
See Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 675 (“Adult outcomes of early childhood temperament include adult personality traits, psychopathology, and school achievement.”).
136
Id. at 677, tbl.32.1; see KAGAN & SNIDMAN, supra note 121, at 26.
130
131
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growth curves tend to flatten. By the middle stage of life, the age at which
judges generally assume the bench, traits will be at their peak stability. 137
Psychology thus confirms a core instinct that judges present with robust,
perceptible interpersonal differences, and that many of these differences are
likely to be both deep and stubborn. It refines that instinct by explaining that
we can anticipate some growth and change, particularly if that judge is highly
motivated to comply with professional norms that push against his or her dispositions, is willing to exert effort to make such compliance habitual, works
within an environment that makes compliance easier than its alternatives, and
receives consistent support and feedback to ease that path. It is not, however,
reasonable to expect the assumption of office itself to effect meaningful
change, let alone to turn a judge into his or her temperamental opposite. By the
time a judge takes office, what we see is, roughly speaking, what we get.
2. Temperament Is a Significant Determinant of Behavior
The point can be sharpened yet further. Not only is assuming judicial office highly unlikely to dislodge temperament-consistent patterns of behavior
but it may very well entrench them. Temperament may be particularly predictive of behavior under stress. 138 Core traits predispose us to particular modes of
perception and understanding of, and response to, our environment. When time
is short, stakes are high, or a situation is ambiguous, humans tend to follow
well-worn paths. Although patterned responses can be reflected upon and overridden, doing so is a luxury, as it consumes mental resources and time. 139 Temperament thus acts as a “determinant of behavior under stress,” with its role
being “especially evident in difficult situations.” 140

137
See Denissen, supra note 32, at 83–84 (showing that personality becomes more mature and
stable as people age, and the least mean-level change is after age forty); Jennifer Lodi-Smith et al.,
Personality Trait Development Across the Life Span, in HANDBOOK OF LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENT
513, 520–21 (Karen L. Fingerman et al. eds., 2011) (discussing a similar observation as Denissen).
138
See Jan Strelau, The Role of Temperament as a Moderator of Stress, in TEMPERAMENT IN
CONTEXT 153, 161–62 (Theodore D. Wachs & Gedolph A. Kohnstamm eds., 2001) (explaining the
connection between temperament, stress, and reactivity).
139
Shane Frederick, Heuristics, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 57, at 205, 205–06. The influence of heuristic processes (including the affect heuristic) on judicial decision making has been most consistently shown by Rachlinski, Wistrich, and
Guthrie. See, e.g., Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 863–67 (2015) (describing “affect heuristic” as a fast,
intuitive process that judges can choose to examine and override through effortful and slow deliberative processes).
140
JAN STRELAU, TEMPERAMENT AS A REGULATOR OF BEHAVIOR: AFTER FIFTY YEARS OF RESEARCH 119 (2008); Strelau, supra note 138, at 154, 157 fig.8.1.
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Any amplifying impact of stress is significant, because stress is a defining
characteristic of judging environments. 141 Indeed, in 2019, two major national
surveys—one in Australia and one in the United States—showed the extent to
which this is so. 142 Australian researchers found “a judicial system not in mental health crisis, but under considerable stress.” 143 They further noted that
symptoms of burnout and trauma are prominent features of the judicial stress
experience. 144 U.S. researchers found that judges’ occupational stressors—
ranging from the weight of decision making to unprepared lawyers—had a
correlation with effects such as fatigue, sleep disturbance, attentional challenge, and rumination. 145 Stressors are not confined to the trial bench, as some
141
Jared Chamberlain & James T. Richardson, Judicial Stress: A Topic in Need of Research, in
STRESS, TRAUMA, AND WELLBEING IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 269, 269–70 (Monica K. Miller & Brian
H. Bornstein eds., 2013); Tracy D. Eells & C. Robert Showalter, Work-Related Stress in American
Trial Judges, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 71, 71 (1994); C. Robert Showalter & Daniel
A. Martell, Personality, Stress and Health in American Judges, 69 JUDICATURE 82, 85 (1985); Celeste F. Bremer, Impact of a Mentoring Program on Occupational Stress, Personal Strain, and Coping
Resources of Newly Appointed U.S. Magistrate Judges 15–16 (Dec. 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Drake University), https://escholarshare.drake.edu/handle/2092/457 [https://perma.cc/W6H4MUFU].
I have completed the preliminary phase of a qualitative, interview-based study of Article III federal judges that includes exploration of stress and its impacts. TERRY A. MARONEY, WHAT JUDGES
FEEL: HOW EMOTIONS PERMEATE THE WORK OF JUDGING (forthcoming). The judicial subjects all
report multiple stresses of the sorts mentioned here, with perceived impacts on their well-being and
job performance.
142
See Carly Schrever et al., The Psychological Impact of Judicial Work: Australia’s First Empirical Research Measuring Judicial Stress and Wellbeing, 28 J. JUD. ADMIN. 141, 141 (2019) (examining stress and well-being in Australian judges); Coal. of Lawyer Assistance Programs (CoLAP),
Presentation at the 2019 National Conference for Lawyer Assistance Programs, CoLAP’s 2019 National Judicial Stress and Resilience Survey: The Results Are In! (Sept. 25, 2019) [hereinafter
CoLAP] (on file with author) (PowerPoint presentation exploring the same in United States judges).
143
Scherer et al., supra note 142, at 167.
144
Id.
145
CoLAP, supra note 142, at 14–17. Stress seems to “go with the territory,” given judging’s
“inescapably lonely features,” public pressure and scrutiny, lack of feedback, background (and sometimes foreground) threats of violence, and workload pressures. See Timothy J. Corrigan, Who Appointed Me God? Reflections of a Judge on Criminal Sentencing, JUDICATURE, Autumn 2016, at 25,
26 (recounting assassination attempt); Michael Kirby, Judicial Stress—An Update, 71 AUSTL. L.J.
774, 780 (1997) (describing how lonely the profession is); Monica K. Miller et al., Using Constructivist Self-Development Theory to Understand Judges’ Reactions to a Courthouse Shooting: An Exploratory Study, 17 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 121, 123, 135–37 (2010) (presenting research indicating
that stress from the threat of violence can affect judges’ personal well-being and professional performance). Particular tasks, such as criminal sentencing, carry unique stressors. Del Quentin Wilber,
Judge Who Had “No Passion for Punishment” Retires After 31 Years, WASH. POST (June 1, 2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/judge-calls-it-quits-after-31-years-sentencing-too-muchto-bear/2012/06/01/gJQA1u3F8U_story.html [https://perma.cc/E9A3-KYG3]. Some judges face dirty,
uncomfortable, even unsafe working conditions. Monica Silvia Ciocoiu et al., Implications of Levels
of Stress Factors in Magistrate’s Activity, 15 ROM. BIOTECHNOLOGICAL LETTERS 126, 129–30
(2010) (reporting data on Romanian judges’ stress stemming from factors such as poor lighting, inad-
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might suppose, 146 particularly as appellate judges face the unique challenges of
being dependent on one another. 147 Of course, judging is (or ought to be) more
than a traumatic daily grind. If it were not, we would ask why anyone would
choose to do it at all. 148 Indeed, the recent surveys indicate that many judges
find their work less stressful than their prior legal practice had been, and signs
of extreme distress appear less prevalent in judicial populations as compared to
practicing lawyers. 149 Judging’s many rewards include the pride of civic service, the pleasure of intellectual challenge, prestige, and the ability to make a
difference. 150 Judging’s rewards, however, come within a package of challenges. Temperament is a particularly important influence on a judge’s behavior
when those predictable challenges cause predictable stresses.
In addition to being amplified by stress, the behavioral purchase of temperament will be strongest when environmental constraints are weakest. 151 If a
judge is predisposed to act in a particular way but would face certain and immediate sanction for doing so—sanction here conceptualized as any outcome
the judge wishes to avoid, from negative peer evaluation to removal from ofequate work areas, noise, and temperature); Bremer, supra note 141, at 15–16 (laying out common
stressors in the judicial field).
146
ROBERTS, supra note 44, at 6 (explaining how U.S. District Court judges face “far more severe time and resource constraints than their appellate brethren,” while being deprived of “the benefit
of collegial decision making or the comfort of shared consensus”).
147
See Kirby, supra note 145, at 779 (noting the judge’s stress had not lessened after elevation to
the Australian High Court because “the kinds of persons appointed to the court are prone to exert
stress on themselves and on each other”); see also Gerhardt, supra note 45, at 1205–06 (stating that
appellate judges must coexist “in relatively close quarters [and] successfully maintain respect and
civility over long periods of time,” which is not easy). U.S. Supreme Court Justice Whittaker cited
exhaustion and “continuous stresses” as his reasons for stepping down after only five years. Whittaker
Is Leaving U.S Supreme Court, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 30, 1962, at 3.
148
See ROBERTS, supra cite 44, at 8 (“[J]udges make a difference every day, and leave a lasting
legacy, by making our society more fair and just.”); cf. REASON AND IMAGINATION: THE SELECTED
CORRESPONDENCE OF LEARNED HAND 51 (Constance Jordan ed., 2013) (reproducing a letter by
Hand) (“I now see why people in former times went to such extravagances in telling judges what great
men they were. If they had not baited the hook in some such way, the poor suckers would never have
bitten.”).
149
Schrever et al., supra note 142, at 168; CoLAP, supra note 142, at 14–17. My own qualitative
research with federal judges so far bears out these points. MARONEY, supra note 141. Many judges
report that their stress is lessened by greater control over their schedules, relative to practice. Other
judges, however, report that their work-related stress changed but did not lessen. Yet others report that
they now have greater stress. Early analysis suggests these differentials depend on what sort of practice the judge had before taking the bench.
150
SHARYN ROACH ANLEU & KATHY MACK, PERFORMING JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN THE LOWER
COURTS 71–74 (2017); ROBERTS, supra note 44, at 8; Michael D. Kirby, Judicial Stress, 13 AUSTL.
B. REV. 101, 115 (1995) (“[I]n the life of a judicial officer there is excitement, intellectual stimulation,
personal satisfaction, still much public esteem, a general sense of social utility and worthwhileness
. . . .”).
151
CARVER & SCHEIER, supra note 22, at 33 (explaining how one’s environment can affect their
personality).
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fice—she is more likely to exert effort to express a different behavior. Conversely, if a judge stands to be rewarded in a currency about which she cares
(such as peer approval or promotion) for behavior toward which she is less
habitually disposed, the odds of that behavior increase. The less certain, immediate, and meaningful the sanctions and rewards, the more behavioral impact
temperament will have. 152
Much of the judging universe is characterized by weak external constraints. Judges sometimes declare themselves “God in [their] courtroom,” 153
an assertion that, although literally untrue, does reflect the wide leeway we
typically cede them. After all, norms of courtroom conduct require high levels
of deference to the judge, even when her requirements seem odd or unreasonable. 154 Judicial discipline is rare; reversal is unusual (and sometimes impossible); rewards for norm-compliant behavior are few. 155 Oversight is limited by
the reality that the public seldom is in a position to observe what happens in
most courtrooms, let alone what happens in chambers or conference. The
enormous power of the judge means that whatever her trait constellation, it
will have a relatively open space within which to operate.
Given the ubiquity and multiplicity of judicial stressors, then, and the frequently loose environmental constraints on judicial behavior, we are right to
“worry most”—or at least to worry a lot—about temperament. 156 We need to
predict not how judges will act when putting their best foot forward, but how
they will act under predictable pressures and with predictably minimal oversight. Some judges cope fairly well within these parameters, some thrive, and
some struggle mightily. 157 Temperament is an important determinant of into
which camp any particular judge is likely to fall.

152
Sanctions and rewards act as environmental constraints on expression of characteristics such
as temperament, so in their absence a judge’s trait temperament will be uninhibited. See id.
153
Maroney, supra note 77, at 1268 (quoting Gottlieb v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 310 F. App’x
424, 425 (2d Cir. 2009)).
154
By way of example, see Stephan Futeral, Practical Tips on How to Deal with a Difficult Judge,
FUTERAL & NELSON, LLC (Oct. 26, 2014), https://www.charlestonlaw.net/deal-difficult-judge/ [https://
perma.cc/Q8U2-5UNU] (providing tools to practice before difficult judges); 6 Ways to Handle Difficult
Judges., L. TRULY: L. BLOG (Feb. 12, 2020), https://lawtruly.com/6-ways-to-handle-difficult-judges/
[https://perma.cc/QNU5-JR62] (explaining how lawyers cope with difficult judges).
155
INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUDICIAL
DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS 2–3 (2018).
156
Confirmation Hearings I, supra note 1, at 667 (statement of Sen. Biden); cf. Gerhardt, supra
note 45, at 1205 (judicial nominees “need to be able to handle the intense pressures” of the job).
157
See infra notes 158–163 and accompanying text.
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3. Temperamental Fitness Is Determined by Goodness of Fit
The prior two Subsections explained that a judge’s core traits both (a)
constrain his or her habitual range of attitudes and behaviors and (b) drive particular behavioral patterns within that range, particularly in conditions of stress
and loose external control. A third structural point invites attention to personenvironment interactions.
In popular parlance, temperament “is often referred to as a unidimensional quality that people have more or less of, not unlike intelligence or selfesteem.” 158 Similarly, we talk about judicial temperament as if it is something
people simply have or do not have. This is a mistake.
Judging is not a standardized profession—far from it. Judges might work
in the federal, state, or municipal systems, be elected or appointed, enjoy life
tenure or work under renewable contracts, earn relatively high or low salaries,
hear trials or appeals, sit in urban or rural settings, enjoy shabby or wellappointed surroundings, have a general or specific jurisdiction, wield greater
or lesser docket control, and so on. As the parameters of any given situation
are as important in determining how people will behave as are the traits they
bring to that situation, we cannot focus only on the latter. Rather, we ought to
think about goodness of fit between a judge’s temperamental profile and his or
her specific work environment. 159 The typical parameters of that environment—its cultural norms, repetitive tasks, recurrent stressors, mechanisms of
oversight, decisional constraints, incentives, and daily rhythms—will interact
with the judge’s temperamental constellation with varying levels of harmony
or discord.
Examining goodness of fit in the judicial context is clearly more complicated than treating temperament as a unitary quality. It is the difference between an algorithm and an on/off switch. Accuracy, however, often requires
complexity. Fortunately, as with all temperamental inquiries, looking to goodness of fit does not portend an infinite series of one-offs. As the following Section demonstrates, 160 relative strength or weakness in certain temperamental
domains is closely associated with the attitudes and behaviors that should be
Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 676.
As explained by Thomas and Chess, seminal figures in the psychology of temperament:
“Goodness of fit results when the properties of the environment and its expectations and demands are
in accord with the organism’s own capacities, characteristics, and style of behaving.” ALEXANDER
THOMAS & STELLA CHESS, TEMPERAMENT & DEVELOPMENT 11 (1977). When there is a good fit the
individual is able to adapt and function effectively in his or her environment; under conditions of poor
fit (“discrepancies and dissonances between environmental opportunities and demands and the capacities and characteristics of the organism”) maladaptive functioning is more likely. See id. at 11–12;
Theodore D. Wachs & Gedolph A. Kohnstamm, Introduction, in TEMPERAMENT IN CONTEXT, supra
note 138, at vii, viii (expanding on the importance of goodness of fit in temperament literature).
160
See infra notes 164–273 and accompanying text.
158
159
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understood to typify a generally good or poor judicial temperament. Judicial
assignments, too, can be sliced at a moderate level of abstraction—for example, trial versus appellate, civil versus criminal, elected versus appointed—and
still be of taxonomical utility. Some judges will be temperamentally suited to
many sorts of judicial work, some suited only to particular sorts, and others illsuited to most or all sorts. Assessing those two factors interactionally determines goodness of fit.
An analogy that has proved helpful in psychology is the distinction between dandelions and orchids. Some temperamental constellations are particularly susceptible to environmental influences, others less so. A dandelion-like
individual will thrive in just about any setting. Orchids’ survival, let alone
thriving, depends on highly specific conditions. 161 Dandelions are not necessarily “better,” as their capacity for being spectacular is more limited. 162 Above
a baseline of temperamental suitability for any judicial role, some judges will
be dandelions and others orchids. We would do well to identify where on the
spectrum between a dandelion and an orchid a judge sits, so as to sort her into
a setting in which she can thrive. This sorting is particularly important for the
fussiest of orchids, judges who would be spectacular in only one setting.
Goodness of fit firmly grounds one of the shared intuitions described in
the context of President Trump’s candidacy: some trait constellations make
individuals more or less suited to particular positions of authority. Professional
success in one domain may not, and often does not, translate into success in a
different one, not just because of the different abilities and beliefs upon which
each may call but also because of the harmony or dissonance between one’s
temperament and the parameters of that new domain. 163 In the judicial context,
this insight reminds us that being well-suited to legal practice may not translate
into being well-suited for a judicial role, nor will a good fit in one judicial position necessarily bode well for fit in a different one.
****
This Subpart has posited the following. Judges can mold or improve on
aspects of their temperamental traits but cannot be expected to fundamentally
161
See Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 688–89 (encapsulating the “differential susceptibility
thesis,” whereby certain temperaments are more or less influenced by environment).
162
See id. (describing how those with dandelion temperaments “will be protected from adverse
environments but may in turn benefit less from enriching ones,” whereas those with orchid temperaments may exhibit “particularly negative development in response to bad environments, but also exceptionally positive development in response to good environments”).
163
See Hagop S. Akiskal & Kareen K. Akiskal, In Search of Aristotle: Temperament, Human
Nature, Melancholia, Creativity and Eminence, 100 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 1, 4 (2007) (“[C]reativity and eminence and leadership in different professional domains are related to distinct optimal
mixes of temperamental and cognitive profiles.”).
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reorient or transcend them. Those traits will be an important determinant of the
judge’s behavior, their relative importance varying from relatively weak where
environmental constraints are high and stress low, to very strong when constraints are weak and stress high. Rather than think of someone having or not
having a judicial temperament, we should ask which, if any, specific judicial
environments are a good enough fit with his or her temperamental constellation. The lesser the distance between a judge’s dispositions and a specific judicial position’s demands for specific behaviors, the more likely he or she is to
satisfy those demands with greater consistency and less effort.
C. Substantive Elements of Temperament
With these structural concepts firmly in place, we are ready to turn to substance. This Section identifies the traits that would be predicted to underlie the
most widely-desired judicial behaviors—expressions of compassion, patience,
humility, respect, and open-mindedness—in the greatest variety of judicial
work settings. 164
The substantive component of human temperament may be conceptually
reduced to two basic factors: habitual patterns of emotional attitudes and experiences (often called “reactivity”), and habitual patterns of managing emotions
and behavior, including capacity for impulse control (often called “self-regulation”). 165 Judicial temperament is, at its heart, about precisely those same things.
It is important to note at the outset that emotional experiences are inherently neither problematic nor beneficial, including for judges. 166 Emotion is an
evolved capacity that enables us to navigate our world competently, a mechanism through which we process environmental information, evaluate its personal

164
See infra notes 164–273 and accompanying text. As goodness-of-fit analysis shows, there is
no standard good or bad judicial temperament divorced from work context. For example, we may be
able to tolerate higher levels of disadvantageous traits, and lower levels of advantageous ones, if the
parameters of the specific judicial assignment buffer against the most damaging impacts of traitconsistent behaviors. For example, a judge with relatively low self-regulation skill may be able to act
well during infrequent, highly structured public appearances (such as oral argument) but be unable to
do so on a trial docket. See infra pp. 2136–38 (explicating the most and least advantageous traits given
the shared, baseline requirements of all judicial positions, and proposing how traits falling along a
continuum between the two may interact with the demands and attributes of specific judicial positions).
165
See M. Rosario Rueda, Effortful Control, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at
145, 145–46 (discussing self-regulation and reactivity in children); Rothbart, supra note 32, at 9, 13
(breaking down reactivity further into affect, activity, and attention, and self-regulation as the ability
to control one’s reactivity); Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 677–89, tbl.32.1 (describing traits
associated with reactivity and self-regulation).
166
For an extended defense of this proposition and others in this paragraph, see generally
Maroney, supra note 18, providing extended, empirically-based support for these positions.
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significance, and mobilize action. 167 Though law traditionally has cast emotion
as the enemy of reason, that narrative is, simply put, untrue. 168 Emotion is deeply
intertwined with reason, as it both reflects our beliefs and values about the world
and shapes how we feel, think, and act in that world.169 Like any evolved capacity that is adaptive most of the time, however, emotion is maladaptive some of
the time. It can reflect false beliefs or bad values (for example, that persons of a
particular race are uniquely dangerous), clash with social expectations (for instance, feeling pleased about a death that others are mourning), or motivate a
decisional style (such as quick judgment) or course of action (such as freezing)
that is poorly suited to a particular situation. 170 The relationship between emotion and its suboptimal iterations is like that between cognition and its associated
heuristics and biases. 171 Both are processes that work well most of the time and
poorly some of the time, the latter not diminishing the overall value of the former but, rather, requiring us to notice, question, and potentially override what
feel like “natural” responses. These propositions are as true for judges as for all
humans. When we talk about the substantive aspects of temperament, we therefore are talking not about the virtue or vice of any given emotional experience
and how a judge regulates it, but rather about her deep, relatively durable patterns of emotion and its regulation.
1. Habitual Patterns of Emotional Experience
We all are predisposed to process our surroundings with a particular emotional style. Such habitual or trait emotionality consists of both the speed and
intensity with which one reacts to stimuli—for example, something novel or
frightening—and the content of those reactions—for instance, feelings of anger, sadness, fear, or joy. 172 Given the same stimulus, such as learning of a
death, one person may be quick to react with outward expressions of anger,
whereas another might process the information more slowly and privately, and
tend toward sorrow. Reactivity patterns bear the hallmarks of temperament.
167
See John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Evolutionary Psychology of the Emotions and Their
Relationship to Internal Regulatory Variables, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 114, 127–28 (Michael
Lewis et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008) (describing the evolutionary function and advantage of emotions). See
generally THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS (Andrew S. Fox et al. eds., 2d ed.
2018) (exploring fundamental questions of emotion through the voices of leading researchers).
168
Maroney, supra note 18, at 642–51.
169
See id. (synthesizing psychological, philosophical, and neurological scholarship to offer extensive support for these propositions).
170
Id. at 649–51.
171
Id. at 650 & n.111; cf. Wistrich, Rachlinski & Guthrie, supra note 139, at 863–65.
172
Richard J. Davidson, Approach/Withdrawal, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE
AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 57, at 49, 49–50; Revelle & Scherer, supra note 123, at 305; Rothbart, supra note 32, at 9.
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These patterns are at least somewhat heritable, are observable in both young
children and adults, and are relatively stable (particularly in their adult manifestations). 173 Such patterns cannot be globally assessed as good or bad. They
are simply different, and become good or bad only in relation to what is appropriate for one’s environment and goals.
Judging is the relevant environment for our inquiry, and producing the desired set of behaviors the relevant goal. Certain patterns of habitual emotionality are particularly likely to promote those desired judicial behaviors, with others particularly likely to do the opposite.
a. Dispositional Negativity
Dispositional negativity would be expected to have an undesirable effect
on judicial behaviors. 174 This temperamental profile admits of two rather different iterations: a stable tendency toward anger (and its close cousins, irritation, frustration, and contempt) or a stable tendency toward fear (and its close
cousin, anxiety). In either iteration, dispositional negativity creates a propensity for overreaction to stressors, aversive challenges, and threats; manifests itself in negative feelings even when such stressors, aversive challenges, and
threats are remote or absent; and predisposes a person to act in ways that evoke
stressors, aversive challenges, and threats to which they then react. 175 Dispositional negativity also is likely to bias a person toward “indiscriminate” negative feelings and behaviors. 176 Each of these impacts is negative in the judging
context.
i. Anger, Irritation, Frustration, and Contempt
The anger-heavy iteration of dispositional negativity is particularly likely
to promote the behaviors generally considered the markers of a poor judicial
temperament. It is worth reiterating that anger itself is not the problem. As I
have argued at length elsewhere, and as Solum would concur, judges not only
See supra notes 110–163 and accompanying text.
See Alexander J. Shackman et al., The Psychological and Neurobiological Bases of Dispositional Negativity, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS, supra note 167, at 67,
67 (correlating dispositional negativity with reactivity to stressors).
175
Id. One general difference between these iterations is that the former set of emotions tends to
motivate one to approach the offending person or situation, and the latter to motivate withdrawal.
Nico H. Frijda, Action Tendencies, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 57, at 1, 1–2; see Davidson, supra note 172, at 49–50 (explaining the relationship
between withdrawal and fear). But see Kevin S. LaBar, Fear and Anxiety, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 751, 751–52 (Lisa Feldman Barrett et al. eds., 4th ed. 2016) (noting that specific fear episodes
can also call up a “fight” response rather than a “flight” one).
176
Shackman et al., supra note 174, at 71.
173
174
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regularly get angry, but sometimes they should.177 As one eminent philosopher
put it, “Can one have a sense of justice without the capacity and willingness to
be personally outraged?” 178 Even misplaced or slightly excessive displays of
anger are normal, given the welter of offensive behavior to which judges regularly are exposed, and often can be tolerated when they are infrequent and their
concrete impacts contained. 179 If our concern is with judicial temperament, our
focus properly is on frequent, reflexive, inadequately justified, vehemently expressed anger, as such a pattern is likely be to rooted in an underlying trait. 180
Dispositional anger consists of a stable tendency “to attribute hostile intent in others’ actions, to perceive frustration in a variety of situations, and to
engage in continuous conscious pondering and rumination over one’s own anger, as well as the perceived provocations of others.” 181 Persons high in trait
anger demonstrate heightened frequency and intensity of mood changes, and
increased reactivity to stress. 182 This disposition also tends to manifest in conflictual behaviors. Temperamentally “hostile and argumentative” persons “tend
to be vigilant for potential provocation from others, to initiate and sustain arguments when provocation is perceived, and to react angrily when others’ behaviors are viewed as hostile or rejecting.” 183 Dispositional anger also tends to
entail frequent experiences of the closely-related emotions of frustration and
irritation. 184 Frustration is an uncomfortable feeling attending the perception
that one’s goals are being blocked or desires thwarted. 185 Irritation, too, is un177
Righteous judicial anger is, in Aristotelean terms, virtuous—felt “at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way . . . .”
ARISTOTLE, supra note 28, bk. II, at 27; Maroney, supra note 77, at 1206 (explaining how a righteously angry judge accurately assesses that someone has committed an unwarranted act, is motivated to
impose a proportional consequence, and gives voice to shared moral values; her anger expression is,
even if forceful, purposeful and dignified); see also Solum, supra note 72, at 1374 (explaining the
need for proportionate judicial anger).
178
ROBERT C. SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: EMOTIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT 42 (1990).
179
Maroney, supra note 77, at 1284–85.
180
Dispositional anger is both “moderately to substantially heritable” and observable in both
young children and adults. Kirby Deater-Deckard & Zhe Wang, Anger and Irritability, in HANDBOOK
OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 124, 124–32; Rothbart, supra note 32, at 6. I have noted that
“certain judges seem prone to anger states that are relatively frequent and extreme,” suggested that
such a characteristic might lie at the heart of what we call poor judicial temperament, and promised to
research the question further. Maroney, supra note 77, at 1213 & n.31. My instinct was largely correct
but incomplete, as trait anger is not (as I suggested, and as Solum asserts) the sole measure of a poor
temperament.
181
Deater-Deckard & Wang, supra note 180, at 126.
182
Richard A. Depue & Yu Fu, Neurobiology and Neurochemistry of Temperament in Adults, in
HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 368, 369–70; see Rothbart, supra note 32, at 7–8.
183
Deater-Deckard & Wang, supra note 180, at 126.
184
Id. at 124–25 tbl.7.1.
185
Id.
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comfortable, though less intense than anger and without as strong an element
of moral judgment. 186 Both emotional states can be entirely warranted, but
when habitual—what we colloquially might call irascibility or grouchiness—
they are just as worrisome as anger, particularly because they are similarly
linked to verbal and physical aggression. 187 Further, a habitually angry person
may regularly feel and display another closely-related emotion: contempt. 188
Contempt combines aspects of anger and disgust. Like anger, it reflects a perception of wrongdoing, and like disgust, it reflects a judgment that the offender is
repulsive. 189 Contempt is especially dangerous for judges. Contempt marks the
difference between legitimate expressions of authority and illegitimate expressions of superiority. Contemptuous treatment is a familiar element of judicial
disciplinary proceedings, generally involving insults, ridicule, and ritual humiliation. 190
The anger-frustration-irritation triptych, even without a contempt element,
thus embodies an underlying disposition not only for a specific sort of internal
experience—such as “thinking angry thoughts” and having “angry feelings”—
but also for aggressive speech and behaviors reflecting those thoughts and feelings. 191 In fact, by expressing less warmth, escalating, and engaging in “toxic
interpersonal behaviors” like use of “contempt and sarcasm,” persons with this
temperamental profile actually may create conflictual situations, to which they
will then have characteristically exaggerated responses. 192
Particularly with a contempt element, this trait cluster poses a real danger
of regular manifestation of the hostile, dismissive, sarcastic, callous, and rude
behaviors that are a relative-consensus hallmark of poor judicial temperament. 193 This trait cluster also can lead to decisional errors. Left unchecked,
anger and its close cousins can curtail deliberation and increase punitive behavior, regardless of whether those feelings are relevant or justified—a particular danger for judges who tend to feel these emotions with greater frequency

186
Id.; Peter Kuppens, Irritation, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE
SCIENCES, supra note 57, at 226, 226–27.
187
Leonard Berkowitz, Frustration, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE
SCIENCES, supra note 57, at 188, 188; Deater-Deckard & Wang, supra note 180, at 124; Kuppens,
supra note 186, at 227.
188
Ursula Hess, Contempt, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 57, at 99, 99–100 (explaining the “contempt-anger-disgust” triad); Shackman et al.,
supra note 174, at 68.
189
Hess, supra note 188, at 99–100; Maroney, supra note 77, at 1259.
190
See Roach Anleu et al., supra note 79, at 66–68 (providing examples of such behavior).
191
Deater-Deckard & Wang, supra note 180, at 124.
192
Shackman et al., supra note 174, at 68.
193
GREENSTEIN, supra note 43, at 73 (“A jurist with appropriate judicial temperament uses authority gracefully.”); Maroney, supra note 77, at 1259.
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and less justification. 194 Moreover, this pattern of emotional experience contributes to poor health outcomes, including cardiovascular pathophysiology
and substance abuse, both of which can affect judges’ professional performance and longevity. 195
Further, the general rule that “what we see in an adult judge is what we
are likely to get” has particular purchase for this iteration of dispositional
negativity. Although many judges share the same environmental challenges
and stressors, only some display this behavioral profile. Though the parameters
of dispositional anger may vary over time, the “magnitude of change over
adulthood is modest,” if it happens at all. 196 Change is likely to be even more
constricted the more extreme the trait profile and the weaker any meaningful
environmental pushback. A judge that presents with strong indicators of this
sort of dispositional negativity therefore is a very risky bet. Such a judge is
likely to continue to manifest a short fuse, antisocial attitudes, and aggressive
behaviors, absent an intervention that effectively addresses the trait, the environmental constraints that allow the trait to be expressed, or both. 197
ii. Fear and Anxiety
The second iteration of dispositional negativity, a tendency toward fear and
anxiety, also poses a challenge to judicial temperament, if a less visible one. 198
A fearful disposition implicates judicial temperament by hindering development of courage. Courage is an underappreciated aspect of judicial fitness.
Although tributes to great judges often laud their courage, 199 it is not generally
194
Maroney, supra note 77, at 1265–69 (citing to, inter alia, Jennifer S. Lerner & Larissa Z.
Tiedens, Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal Tendencies Shape Anger’s Influence
on Cognition, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 115 (2006); and Paul M. Litvak et al., Fuel in the
Fire: How Anger Impacts Judgment and Decision-Making, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ANGER: CONSTITUENT AND CONCOMITANT BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL PROCESSES
(Michael Potegal et al. eds., 2010)).
195
Nathan S. Consedine, Health-Promoting and Health-Damaging Effects of Emotions, in
HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS, supra note 167, at 676, 683 tbl.42.1; Deater-Deckard & Wang, supra note
180, at 135.
196
Deater-Deckard & Wang, supra note 180, at 133 (noting, though, that average levels of anger
gradually decrease over the human life span).
197
See id. at 136 (noting the potential efficacy of anger management interventions with adults).
198
See Rothbart, supra note 32, at 7 (including in negative emotionality habitual anxiety, “submissiveness, fear, sorrow, tenderness, and disgust”; these are closely related “repressive or inhibitive”
emotions); Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 678; see also Maroney, supra note 77, at 1229 (noting
the relative ease with which characteristic anger behaviors may be observed).
199
See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, What Makes a Judge Great: To A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 513, 513 (1993) (stating that “above all” a judge needs “courage, that fire which compels
one to do what is right though the heavens—and one’s own career—may fall”); Joe L. Webster, A
Giant Among Judges and Men, JUDICATURE, Summer 2018, at 6, 7 (paying tribute to the “unsurpassed courage” of North Carolina Judge Sammie Chess, Jr.).
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included in law’s temperamental taxonomies (nor, for that matter, is it folded
into the independent constructs of integrity and competence). 200 Judicial independence, however, requires courage, and courage is temperamental. The hard
reality of actual and threatened violence against judges and their families, for
example, could push judges to rule so as to avoid making enemies. 201 Nevertheless, we require that they resist that push. Similarly, the threat of angering
or alienating professional and social peers, powerful constituencies, and fellow
government actors in the other branches could pull judges away from difficult
but necessary actions. We likewise require that they resist that pull. 202
The building blocks of courage—differential propensities toward submissiveness, timidity, and fear—are basic iterations of habitual emotionality, observable in both children and in adults. They have a genetic basis, show relative stability (particularly in adults), and express in behavior. 203 To be clear,
episodic fear is critical to normal human functioning, including in a judge.204
Indeed, courage is not the absence of fear but the ability to act consistent with
one’s goals and values despite reasonable fears. 205 Chronic fearfulness, however, can overwhelm that capacity, instead motivating avoidance and withdrawal. 206 As Chief Justice Roberts has observed, judging is no job for “timid . . .
souls.” 207 High levels of trait fearfulness threaten something desired, just as
surely as high levels of trait anger promise something undesired.

200
Both Solum and the Federal Judicial Center recognize courage to be a critical judicial quality,
though they do not categorize it as temperamental. Solum, supra note 72, at 1371 (“The disposition to
feel too much fear makes us cowardly; the disposition to insufficient fear makes us rash. Courage
represents a mean between cowardice and rashness.”); accord FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at
26 (categorizing courage as a “judicial competency”).
201
See Corrigan, supra note 145, at 26 (a judge recalling when his life was threatened).
202
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 26 (stating that judges need “the wherewithal to exercise courage in the face of difficult and unpopular decisions”); Solum, supra note 72, at 1371 (“A
civically courageous judge understands that the good opinion of others is worth having if it flows
from having done justice and that social approval for injustice is an impermissible motive for judicial
action.”).
203
Depue & Fu, supra note 182, at 370; Kevin B. MacDonald, Temperament and Evolution, in
HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 273, 279–80; Rothbart, supra note 32, at 6, 9; Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 677–78 tbl.32.1; Zuckerman, supra note 123, at 42.
204
Fear alerts us to dangers and motivates us to take protective action—for example, arranging
for increased security, or planning to leave on a remote vacation immediately after issuing a blockbuster ruling. LaBar, supra note 175, at 752 (explaining how fear “serves to mobilize bodily resources” and “facilitates action planning” to protect endangered interests).
205
Courage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
courage [https://perma.cc/8XQM-P77G].
206
Arne Öhman, Fear, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE SCIENCES,
supra note 57, at 182, 182–83 (noting that fear-driven avoidance interferes with normal adjustment to
life challenges); Shackman et al., supra note 174, at 70–71.
207
ROBERTS, supra note 44, at 6.
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Closely related to trait fearfulness is trait anxiety. 208 Though these phenomena may (and often do) co-occur, they are not the same thing. Fear is
linked to an identifiable trigger, whereas anxiety is more global, characterized
by an unpleasant feeling that one’s environment is uncertain and potentially
threatening. 209 Like fear, anxiety has functional utility. Humans need to be able
to imagine future threats and negative consequences so that we can avert or
plan for them. 210 Indeed, a deficit of anxiety would be highly troublesome in a
judge, perhaps signifying undue confidence in the “right” answer, underestimation of the dangers of mistake, and a lack of concern with stakes. Research has
even shown that anxiety can promote high levels of work performance, if we
appraise anxiety-producing events as challenges as opposed to hazards. 211 Persons with elevated trait anxiety, however, are likely, if exposed to stressors, to
experience more frequent (and likely more intense) episodes of anxiety with
less justification, and will be biased toward interpreting even ambiguous
events as threatening. 212 In addition to dampening the potential for moments of
courage, as fearfulness would, persistently elevated anxiety (in addition to being subjectively distressing) would theoretically make a judge less decisive. 213
Trait fearfulness and anxiety therefore should be acknowledged as core
concerns of judicial temperament. A judge who sits at their upper extremes
would have a difficult time withstanding the demands of the position. 214 The
habitually fearful or anxious judge whose traits present in a pronounced but less
extreme manner may well be able to withstand such pressures, but will need to

208
See Depue & Fu, supra note 182, at 369–70 (explaining why many researchers over the years
researched fear and anxiety as one and the same); LaBar, supra note 175, at 751 (describing how
anxiety can present as either a discrete state or as dispositional characteristic).
209
LaBar, supra note 175, at 751–52; Richard J. McNally, Anxiety, in OXFORD COMPANION TO
EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 57, at 42, 42–44.
210
Depue & Fu, supra note 182, at 370; McNally, supra note 209, at 43–44.
211
Juliane Strack et al., Must We Suffer to Succeed?: When Anxiety Boosts Motivation and Performance, 38 J. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 113, 113 (2017).
212
McNally, supra note 209, at 42 (“[A] high-trait anxious person may infrequently experience
elevations of anxiety if he or she happens to live a relatively stressor-free life. Analogously, a glass
vase remains characterized by the disposition of fragility even if it is never shattered by a force.”);
Shackman et al., supra note 174, at 67–70.
213
Jerome Kagan, The Biography of Behavioral Inhibition, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT,
supra note 32, at 69, 74 (“Everyone experiences uncertainty . . . but only some individuals experience
salient, uncomfortable feelings and a response paralysis.”); McNally, supra note 209, at 42; cf. FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 27 (postulating that judges that act with “decisiveness” “rarely second-guess their own decisions, which reduces personal stress”).
214
Such a judge might develop a diagnosable anxiety disorder, which may respond well to treatment. Shackman et al., supra note 174, at 67. Such treatment might move the judge into acceptable
territory, particularly with ongoing support and attention to minimizing unnecessary stressors in his or
her workplace. See supra note 32.
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both find a judicial role that is least endangered by these traits and invest in
building the regulatory skills that will enable her to mitigate their impacts. 215
b. Positive Emotionality
Desired judicial behaviors are more likely not only when the abovedescribed traits are absent or relatively low, but also when other traits are relatively high. One such trait dimension is “positive emotionality,” another broad
construct that embraces two distinct patterns. 216 The first is a propensity for
calm satisfaction, including with lower-intensity stimuli, and frequent feelings
and expressions of pleasantness. The second tends toward exuberance, excitement, joy, and sensation-seeking. 217 Both forms of positive emotionality bring
significant benefits. They buffer against depression, promote resilience and
longevity, and generate both enhanced social competence and “sustained engagement and expectations of success.” 218 Dispositionally positive persons
also tend to be more open-minded. They have a broadened perspective on their
own thoughts and actions, as well as the thoughts and actions of others, in contrast to the “narrowed mindsets sparked by negative emotions.” 219 The dispositionally positive judge will not, of course, feel happy or content at all times,
nor should she, as that would be a highly abnormal reaction to often distressing
circumstances. She is, however, more likely than those with opposing dispositions to be resilient, engage productively with others, and maintain an open
mind with less effort.
Though both forms of positive emotionality generally are a boon, they are
not necessarily equally good fits with the opportunities and challenges that
typify many forms of judging. The low-arousal iteration of dispositional positivity will most consistently promote expressions of calm and patience—
listening without interrupting, giving matters the time they need, and speaking
in a measured tone. That disposition generally is inconsistent with feelings of
impatience and frustration. 220 Although judges can (and do) learn to adopt a
calm demeanor despite a contrary internal state, including an aroused one, 221
See infra notes 243–262 and accompanying text.
Samuel P. Putnam, Positive Emotionality, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at
105, 109 (discussing the types of positive emotionality).
217
Id. at 114–17.
218
Davidson, supra note 172, at 49–50; Putnam, supra note 216, at 115–17.
219
See Barbara L. Fredrickson, Positive Emotions, in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND
THE AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 57, at 310, 310 (outlining the “broaden-and-build” theory of
positive emotion); see also infra note 282 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of openmindedness).
220
Putnam, supra note 216, at 114.
221
See infra notes 243–262 and accompanying text.
215
216
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one who generally defaults to feeling calm will find it far easier to consistently
display calm behaviors. 222
Relative to their calmer counterparts, judges with the high-arousal, exuberant iteration of positivity are less likely to consistently display these desired
low-arousal behaviors. Such persons desire rewards and pursue goals with particular fervor, and react with heightened elation when successful but with
heightened frustration when unsuccessful. 223 For better or worse, judges seldom enjoy high-adrenalin rewards. Their victories tend to be of the muted, perspectival sort—for example, knowing that one has done a good job in difficult
circumstances, articulating a difficult concept in a way that will further the
progress of law, enjoying the camaraderie of clerks and colleagues, or appreciating one’s contribution to the democratic project. 224 Simultaneously, highadrenalin goal blockages abound—for example, attorneys whose marginallycompetent verbosity is holding up a proceeding, or appellate colleagues who
refuse to endorse or even debate a passionately held position. Given the lopsided reward/blockage ratio judges tend to face, a high-exuberant temperament
profile would be predicted more frequently to manifest in impatience and even
aggression. 225 Thus, trait exuberance can cause some of the negative behaviors
primarily linked to dispositional anger, as both are associated with high arousal. Further, the high-exuberant judge may be more at risk of boredom during
routine and tedious moments, which most forms of judging serve up regularly. 226 She may, however, find difficult tasks appealing, as they are highly stimulating; be particularly sustained by bigger victories; and seek leadership positions, thereby propelling institutional innovation.
In general, the dispositionally positive judge of either sort is likely to be a
good temperamental bet. Within that category, the judge characterized by a
propensity toward calm satisfaction is least likely to exhibit aggressive, impa222
Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1485,
1537–43 (2011) (explaining how it is easier to externally express a genuine internal state than it is to
adopt a display that contrasts with an internal state).
223
Putnam, supra note 216, at 110–11.
224
See ROACH ANLEU & MACK, supra note 150, at 71–74, 167 (presenting evidence of Australian judges’ high levels of satisfaction with intrinsic aspects of their work, like intellectual challenge
and value to society); ROBERTS, supra note 44, at 8 (describing the overarching sense of civic duty
with which judges are rewarded); Stina Bergman Blix & Åsa Wettergren, A Sociological Perspective
on Emotions in the Judiciary, 8 EMOTION REV. 32, 35 (2016) (quoting a judge who was proud to have
been seen as fair in her overseeing of a case). To a person, the participant judges in this author’s study
cite to these sorts of feelings as the most common positivity they experience on the job. As one said
when trying to capture what his workplace happiness feels like: “It’s not a high-five kind of thing,”
but rather a “sublime satisfaction.” Interview with Judge #22 (Mar. 2017).
225
Putnam, supra note 216, at 114–15.
226
REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra note 148, at 98–99 (reproducing a letter from Learned
Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes describing his struggles with frustration and boredom); Putnam,
supra note 216, at 111 (explaining how positive emotionality increases the risk of boredom).
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tient behaviors, because she is least likely to feel the emotions that spur such
behaviors, and she is most likely to find pleasure in the small, quiet, often private victories of judging. The exuberant judge, though facing relatively greater
challenge on those fronts, is still likely to fare better than her dispositionally
negative counterpart. More, she will bring significant energy to the bench.
c. Kindness
Also highly relevant to judicial temperament is a relatively new member
of psychologists’ temperamental taxonomies: dispositional kindness. This concept speaks not to individual acts of kindness, which may or may not be appropriate in any given situation, but rather to a deep-seated “constellation of
positive attitudes, feelings, and behaviors toward others,” including “empathy,
prosocial behavior, generosity, and altruism.” 227 Whereas dispositional positivity is directed to the self, dispositional kindness is directed toward others. People differ significantly in these emotional capacities, experiences, and the behaviors they motivate. 228 Further, those differences are observable in both children and adults, are amenable to measurement, appear to have distinct neural
and genetic correlates, and show substantial longitudinal stability across the
life course. 229
Dispositional kindness is, like trait fearfulness, an underappreciated determinant of judicial fitness that should be recognized as temperamental. Empathy,
or the propensity to understand and care about others’ emotional states, is at the
center of trait kindness; prosocial behaviors, or voluntary acts intended to benefit
others, are its prototypical behavioral manifestation; and feelings of compassion
link the two. 230 As we have seen, compassion is one of the most consistently cited elements of judicial temperament in extant accounts, though such accounts
seldom explain why. 231 It is, further, a bit of an oddity, the only high-consensus
227
Ariel Knafo & Salomon Israel, Empathy, Prosocial Behavior, and Other Aspects of Kindness,
in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 168, 168.
228
Id. at 170–73.
229
Id.
230
See Batson, supra note 57, at 91 (describing compassion as an “other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of another person,” reliant on “(1) perceiving the
other as in need (distress) and (2) valuing the other’s welfare”); Knafo & Israel, supra note 227, at
173, 175 (discussing the dimensions of kindness); see also Terry A. Maroney & Philip AckermanLieberman, “As a Father Shows Compassion for His Children”: Ancient and Contemporary Perspectives on Judicial Empathy, 3 J.L. RELIGION & ST. 240, 243–46 (2014) (explicating the “empathic arc”
of empathy to compassion to behavior).
231
See supra notes 42–105 and accompanying text. Even Chief Justice Roberts, an ardent supporter of the neutral-umpire vision of judging, thinks good judging requires compassion. ROBERTS,
supra note 44, at 4. Chief Justice Roberts’ position is seconded by a critical mass of highly-regarded
state-court judges. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE: A
FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT THE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF STATE TRIAL COURT JUDGES 26
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element that is transparently emotional. In a cultural environment that generally
eschews judicial emotion and that periodically erupts with “radioactive” clashes
over judicial empathy, 232 compassion appears as a rare designated emotional
outpost. 233 The psycho-legal theory solves this apparent puzzle. We evaluate
traits by reference to the functions they are thought to serve in the daily work of
judging, and compassion promotes desired behaviors. Moderate to high trait
kindness inclines people to have and to demonstrate respect for their fellow humans: to be willing to listen to them, to understand them, to care about them, and
to be willing to work hard to serve them well. 234 Low dispositional kindness, at
the opposite pole, expresses in trait callousness and misanthropy. That trait
would be expected to manifest in the displays of arrogance, rudeness, and disregard that fray social bonds among judges and between the judiciary and the public. We have lacked the vocabulary with which to explain why compassion feels
both important and temperamental. Fortunately, this theory provides it.
Judging is a particularly demanding and important form of public service,
so it makes sense that we would value persons who naturally are inclined to
care about that public. Gainsaying that proposition appears as difficult as overcoming the law’s general aversion to judicial emotion. Indeed, tributes to
“great judges” typically praise them not just for their intellect and courage but
also for their benevolence. 235 One much-beloved judge has written that “[i]f
we judges could possess but one attribute, it should be a kind and understanding heart. The bench is no place for cruel or callous people regardless of their
other qualities and abilities.” 236 In the words of another, “[A] judge is more
likely to reach a just answer if he or she cares.” 237
Moderate to high levels of trait kindness therefore should be understood
as critical determinants of a good judicial temperament. In addition to promot(2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Images/Topics/Judicial%20Administration/Elements-of-JudicialExcellence-final-report-Publicv15Dec2017.ashx [https://perma.cc/VDQ7-YLE5] (presenting data showing that well-regarded state-court judges regard compassion as a core trait underlying judicial excellence).
232
See Maroney, supra note 18, at 631 (quoting Baker, supra note 18).
233
See Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 119, 121 (2006) (pointing out the rarity of such “permissibly emotional outposts in
an otherwise ‘rational’ legal universe”).
234
C. Daniel Batson, Altruism (Psychological Perspectives), in OXFORD COMPANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 57, at 26, 26–27 (defining altruism as “a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare” that, according to the empathy-altruism
hypothesis, is spurred by “an other-oriented emotional reaction”).
235
See Calabresi, supra note 199, at 513 (“[A] judge needs . . . generosity of spirit, that compassion which causes one to know what it is like to be in trouble and in pain, and to desire instinctively to
reach out and help.”); A Tribute to Judge James R. Browning, 73 MONT. L. REV. 1, 10 (2012) (describing Judge Browning as kind and compassionate).
236
Devitt, supra note 6, at 574.
237
Denny Chin, Sentencing: A Role for Empathy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1580 (2012).
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ing displays of respect and caring, these levels would be expected to buffer
against judicial cynicism and despair, attitudes that feed destructive behaviors
toward both the public and the self. The work of judging often shows humanity
at its worst. To perform that work well over time requires a fundamental disposition to believe in humanity’s essential decency. 238
Extremely high levels of trait kindness, however, present specific dangers.
A judge who is too closely attuned to the emotions and needs of others may,
given the spectrum of human suffering with which most judges regularly are in
contact, experience emotional exhaustion, compassion fatigue, and burnout, all
of which can damage well-being and job performance. 239 Such a judge may
also be at risk of “pathological altruism.” 240
At non-pathological levels, though, the high-kindness individual will take
more available opportunities to act prosocially, and will incur greater costs to
do so, than will persons with lesser levels of this trait. They remain, however,
sensitive to opportunity and cost, and will not extend helping behaviors if doing so would violate their own sense of priorities and ethics. 241 We therefore
would expect the dispositionally kind judge, if ethical and competent, to obey
the rule of law, acting as prosocially as the law permits but no more. 242 A judge
at the highest extremes of this trait, in contrast, would be expected to find staying in his lane unusually challenging if doing so were to require him to withhold helping behaviors. Short of that extreme, however, trait kindness is a core
aspect of a good judicial temperament.
****
This subsection has proposed the following. At the substantive level, to
possess a generally good judicial temperament means to have a relatively low
propensity to experience emotional states likely to express in undesirable behaviors, and a relatively high propensity to experience emotional states likely
to express in desirable ones. Judges high in trait anger are particularly likely to
experience anger, irritation, frustration, and contempt, to perceive situations as
238
A widely beloved judge with whom this author works frequently, and who is possessed of a
great love of humanity, recounts how even he once came home from a difficult day on the bench and
said to his wife, “You know, people suck.”
239
Monica K. Miller et al., Judicial Stress: The Roles of Gender and Social Support, 25 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 602, 602–04, fig.1 (2018).
240
Knafo & Israel, supra note 227, at 169 (explaining how polar opposites on this trait dimension
are the extremely low levels of empathy found in psychopathy and autism, and uncontrolled, emotionally exhausting empathy).
241
Id. at 175 (describing how one might feel empathy with and compassion for earthquake victims, but be unwilling or unable to overcome barriers to helping, such as lack of money or time to
volunteer).
242
Cf. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 29 (stating that a competent judge “[e]xpresses
empathy for others in appropriate ways”).

2020]

Judicial Temperament

2131

personally arousing and offensive, and to display aggressive and disrespectful
behaviors. A less dramatic but still meaningful temperamental vulnerability is
posed by those high in trait fearfulness, as they are less likely to maintain the
courage necessary to make difficult decisions. Judges prone to very high levels
of anxiety may be indecisive and lack sufficient resilience to handle the position’s demands. In contrast, judges high in trait positivity are likely to exhibit
resilience, competence in interpersonal relationships, and open-mindedness.
Judges whose trait positivity tends toward satisfaction and contentment are
particularly likely to both feel and project calm, and to derive pleasure from
ordinary accomplishments. Judges whose positivity tends toward exuberance
and joy may have to work harder to project calm and to cope with boredom,
but are likely to take on difficult tasks with enthusiasm and to relish achievements. Finally, temperamentally kind judges would be expected to resist cynicism, to regularly treat others with understanding and compassion, and, when
the law allows, to extend permissible forms of relief to those in distress,
whether at the individual or systemic level.
2. Habitual Patterns of Self-Regulation
The speed, intensity, and content of emotional responses is one pillar of
psychological temperament. Self-regulation, the second pillar, is just as deepseated and influential. It is equally as critical to judicial temperament.
Rather than being at the mercy of our emotions, humans regularly exert
effort to influence what emotions we have, when we have them, and how those
emotions are experienced and expressed—for example, so as to conform to
social expectations and professional norms. 243 We do so with a wide variety of
strategies, such as adopting a “poker face,” biting our tongue, thinking about
something else, or avoiding certain people and situations. 244 Also referred to as
“effortful control,” this dimension is driven by an individual’s intrinsically motivated ability to control their emotions. 245 In adults, this dimension captures
243
See James J. Gross, Antecedent- and Response-Focused Emotion Regulation: Divergent Consequences for Experience, Expression, and Physiology, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 224,
226 (1998) (exploring regulatory strategies designed to change the emotion-eliciting situation, or
interpretation of and/or response to that situation); see also Iris B. Mauss et al., Culture and Automatic
Emotion Regulation, in REGULATING EMOTIONS: CULTURE, SOCIAL NECESSITY, AND BIOLOGICAL
INHERITANCE 39, 40 (Marie Vandeckerckhove et al. eds., 2008) (“[D]eliberate or automatic changes
in any aspect of the emotional response, including the eliciting situation, attention, appraisals, subjective experience, behavior, or physiology.”).
244
Gross, supra note 243, at 224–26; Maroney, supra note 222, at 1505–08; Maroney & Gross,
supra note 49, at 144–46.
245
Rueda, supra note 165, at 145; see Mary K. Rothbart & Brad E. Sheese, Temperament and
Emotion Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION 331, 336 (James J. Gross ed., 2007)
(defining “effortful control” as “the ability to inhibit a dominant response in order to perform a sub-
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variation in ability to shape emotional experiences, the thoughts underlying
them, and the actions they motivate, by focusing, moving, and sustaining attention; overriding initial or dominant responses in favor of secondary or subdominant ones; and activating a behavior despite a desire to avoid it. 246 A common
analogy is that emotional reactivity is the accelerator and self-regulation the
brake. Less simplistically, self-regulation encompasses the entire range of actions one might take to determine a car’s accelerated movements, including
steering, downshifting, speeding up, and braking. 247
Self-regulatory tendencies—true to type for a core temperamental element—emerge early, tend to persist, hold cross-culturally, have genetic and
neural correlates, tie into core features of a mature personality, and admit of
significant individual differences. 248 Persons high in self-regulation are able to
display a variety of responses to a range of situations, allowing greater decisional leeway to—for example—approach situations they fear and inhibit actions they desire, when necessary to meet their short and long-term goals. 249
Such ability is considered a hallmark of emotional intelligence. 250 Persons low
on this trait dimension tend to rely unreflectively on a narrow set of responses
and frequently deploy less-advantageous avoidant coping mechanisms. 251
These differential regulatory patterns have predictably differential impacts on
dominant response, to plan, and to detect errors”). The closely related concept of executive attention
concerns itself with flexible control of cognition, while temperament concerns itself with regulation of
emotion. As emotion is connected to both thoughts and behavior, a focus on the former includes attention to the latter. Rueda, supra note 165, at 147; see Rothbart, supra note 32, at 9, 13.
246
Rueda, supra note 165, at 145–47.
247
In the psychological literature, regulatory dimensions of temperament sometimes are labeled
“effortful control” and “constraint.” Depue & Fu, supra note 182, at 388; Rueda, supra note 165, at
145; see also Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 677 tbl.32.1 (finding effortful control to be among
the most enduring trait dimensions).
248
See Lengua & Wachs, supra note 32, at 524–25 (describing how the regulatory domain predisposes people to “utilize specific appraisal, coping, or emotional regulation strategies to deal with
stress” and “demands”); Kimberly J. Saudino & Manjie Wang, Quantitative and Molecular Genetic
Studies of Temperament, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 315, 317 (explaining the
genetic components of emotional regulation).
249
Rueda, supra note 165, at 145–47; see Lauren K. White et al., Neurobiology and Neurochemistry of Temperament in Children, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 347, 352–59
(finding that effective regulation calls on both automatic and “higher-order executive processes” to
ascertain the nature of a challenge and deploy situationally appropriate attentional and behavioral
responses).
250
Nicola S. Schutte et al., Antecedent-Focused Emotion Regulation, Response Modulation and
Well-Being, 28 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 21, 23 (2009) (citing John D. Mayer et al., Emotional Intelligence: Theory, Findings, and Implications, 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 197, 197–215 (2004)).
251
Rueda, supra note 165, at 147; see Depue & Fu, supra note 182, at 389 fig.18.6 (showing the
interaction between emotionality and constraint); Nancy Eisenberg et al., Effortful Control and Its
Socioemotional Consequences, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION, supra note 245, at 287, 295
(finding that persons who are neither “overcontrolled nor undercontrolled” are “well adjusted, socially
competent, and resilient”).
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situational success, well-being, and overall adjustment to life demands, including work demands. 252
Strength in flexible, active self-regulation is another element of human
temperament that should be recognized as an essential part of a good judicial
temperament. 253 This trait directly promotes several high-consensus desirable
behaviors, specifically displays of patience, calm, and a dignified demeanor,
even in challenging circumstances, and even when such displays are unexpected due to a contrasting internal state. As the prior subsection proposed, 254
one way to maximize chances that a judge consistently will display such behaviors is to select those with relatively high levels of positive emotionality,
particularly of the low-arousal sort. A second, complimentary way to do so is
to preference judges high in self-regulation. 255
Even dispositionally well-regulated judges, however, will have their regulatory skills tested by the recurrent challenges of judging. Those challenges do
not require uniform down-regulation of emotion, but rather nimble shaping and
switching. It is important for a judge to refrain from showing emotion on her
face in some situations (for example, to prevent a jury from seeing that she
thinks a witness is stretching the truth) but to show it in others (for instance, to
express enthusiasm for a defendant’s progress in reentry court). 256 A patient,
slow, even-toned response is not appropriate when an immediate danger presents itself, such as a lawyer starting to reference inadmissible material. A
judge may want to adopt a caring, soothing tone with a frightened child witness, but a clinical, cold one with an expert witness who refuses to stay on
task. 257 A difficult telephone call with a colleague may de-escalate a conflict,
whereas the sharply-worded email that was satisfying to draft and easy to send
may do the opposite. Further, regulatory strategies differentially consume cog252
See Lengua & Wachs, supra note 32, at 524–25 (referencing regulatory variance in children);
Rothbart & Sheese, supra note 245, at 331–33 (outlining the relationship between temperament and
emotion regulation across the life span).
253
Cf. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 29 (deeming “[e]motional [i]ntelligence,” defined as
“[t]he capacity to perceive and manage one’s own emotions and the emotions of others,” a necessary
judicial attribute).
254
See supra notes 172–242 and accompanying text.
255
A third way, discussed briefly at the end of this Part, is to train judges explicitly to develop
their emotion-regulation skills in the unique contexts of their work settings and demands. See NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 231, at 19–20 (reflecting judicial leaders’ view that their peers
vary greatly on such emotional management skills—indeed, that emotion regulation is among the sites
of greatest variance—and need training). Although training would not be expected to change an underlying trait, it would maximize potential for growth within the envelope of possibility, the parameters of which may be larger than assumed. This author has been offering such trainings for some time,
and is working toward an experimental model to see if regulatory growth can be quantified.
256
Maroney, supra note 222, at 1552–54.
257
ANLEU & MACK, supra note 150, at 120–22 (identifying five distinct styles of demeanor,
ranging from welcoming to rude, that judges may use in different situations).
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nitive resources, and therefore call for differential deployment according to
whether such resources are abundant or constrained. 258 Moreover, although
judging presents constant regulatory demands, regulatory burdens are not equitably distributed. For example, female judges may find their authority eroded by
even well-justified and dignified anger displays, even as male judges may find
their authority cemented. 259 Such disparities add to the already significant load
of self-regulation. 260 Self-regulation is a sophisticated improvisational dance, not
one performed by stepping in numbered outlines on the floor. Every judge needs
a moderate to high level of regulatory skill to pull off this dance. 261
As with other trait dimensions, regulatory skill exists along a continuum.
That is to say, it does not have an on-off switch. Those with other substantive
traits most neatly aligned with core aspects of a good judicial temperament—
positivity, particularly the low-arousal kind, and kindness—would be predicted
to need slightly lower levels of regulatory skill than their opposing counterparts. As less inherently advantageous trait dimensions—the anger/irritation/
frustration/contempt cluster, fear and anxiety, and extraordinarily high levels of
high-arousal positivity—more regularly tend toward problematic behaviors,
high regulatory skill will be at a commensurately higher premium. That skill
would be predicted to make the difference between reacting to a sudden stressor with either an explosive outburst or a deep breath, as well as the difference
between burnout and a long, distinguished career. 262
Judges who come to the bench with strength in the dimension of selfregulation are therefore relatively good temperamental bets. Those who come
with less regulatory strength will need considerably more attention. The greater the distance between regulatory propensities and behavioral expectations,
the greater the danger that the judge’s regulatory needs will outpace regulatory
capacity. Those at the lowest levels of self-regulation may be unsuited for any
or most judicial assignments.
258
See Maroney, supra note 222, at 1545 (explaining that inhibiting facial and bodily signs of
emotion, for example, imposes cognitive load and memory impairment, whereas changing one’s
thoughts about a situation in order to change its emotional significance does not).
259
Jessica M. Salerno & Liana C. Peter-Hagene, One Angry Woman: Anger Expression Increases
Influence for Men, but Decreases Influence for Women, During Group Deliberation, 39 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 581, 581 (2015).
260
See generally Amy S. Wharton, The Sociology of Emotional Labor, 35 ANN. REV. SOC. 147
(2009) (analyzing scholarship on emotional labor—that is, the work of managing emotions in service
of workplace norms and demands—and pointing to factors such as gender that affect such labor).
261
See Maroney & Gross, supra note 49 (presenting a detailed theoretical model of the emotionally well-regulated judge); Wharton, supra note 260 (highlighting the complexity of emotional labor).
262
See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 31, at 29 (asserting that well-regulated judges perceive
situations more fully, “which leads to a fair and accurate process and sound and fair decisions”; “work
well under pressure”; “more easily mature and improve in the judicial function”; and make fewer
mistakes).
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3. Emotion/Regulation Wheelhouses
Thus far, this Section has addressed trait-level emotional experience and
self-regulation as separate. In reality, they are intertwined. Although theoretically any trait combination is possible, some combinations are more likely than
others. 263 Correlations between patterns of reactivity and regulation create individual temperamental wheelhouses, and certain wheelhouses are particularly
common. 264
Those with lesser dispositional regulatory skill tend also to have particularly disadvantageous sorts of trait emotionality. Studies show, for example,
that adults “who have the highest levels of anger also have the lowest levels of
cognitive self-regulation.” 265 High-trait-anger persons appear particularly likely to have lower skill with effortful control processes that would allow them to
down-regulate hostile feelings and override impulses toward their behavioral
expression. 266 Strength in the kindness dimension, in contrast, is linked to
strength in effortful control, including the ability to delay gratification, as well as
in development of conscience and the associated ability to act on principle. 267
Psychological data, therefore, suggest that some judges will sort into diametrically opposing positions when we look to their wheelhouses. Judges with
worrisome levels of trait anger, irritation, frustration, and contempt are particularly likely also to engage the least flexible, most harmful forms of emotion
regulation. Judges with high levels of positive emotionality and kindness are
particularly likely to engage the most flexible and beneficial forms of regulation. The fact that temperamental dimensions tend to cluster in this way is, in
Zentner & Shiner, supra note 32, at 680.
Depue & Fu, supra note 182, at 389. Though this relationship is complex, Depue and Fu provide a useful matrix in which “emotional trait” occupies the vertical axis and “constraint” the horizontal, each on a continuum from low to high. Id. at 389 fig.18.6. The two tendencies form a diagonal of
behavioral stability extending from labile (high emotionality and low constraint) to rigid (low emotionality and high constraint). Id. A similar relationship exists between reactivity and any regulatory
characteristic. See CARVER & SCHEIER, supra note 22, at 35 (observing how “most people do things
that reflect the entire range of a trait dimension,” but “the things they do most often reflect a narrower
portion of that dimension”).
265
See Deater-Deckard & Wang, supra note 180, at 129 (noting, further, that most people experience a gradual improvement in “the capacity to regulate negative emotions” throughout adulthood,
including into “middle age and beyond”).
266
Benjamin M. Wilkowski & Michael D. Robinson, The Anatomy of Anger: An Integrative
Cognitive Model of Trait Anger and Reactive Aggression, 78 J. PERSONALITY 9, 20–24 (2010). The
consequences of reduced regulatory skill are broad-reaching. A recent meta-analysis makes clear that
constrained regulatory flexibility and range, as well as use of strategies such as suppression and denial, are associated with poor physical and mental health outcomes, while the opposite is true of flexible
use of active coping strategies. Bruce E. Compas et al., Coping, Emotion Regulation, and Psychopathology in Childhood and Adolescence: A Meta-Analysis and Narrative Review, 143 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 939, 965–66 (2017).
267
Rueda, supra note 165, at 157.
263
264
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some practical sense, helpful. Slam-dunks and air balls, it appears, will make
themselves known if we look through the proper lens. Where we see them, we
should pay heed: the odds of an air ball becoming a slam-dunk are just as low
as the inverse.
Understanding the most common wheelhouses might also alert us to dangers where (as often is the case) information is incomplete. When a judge presents with a documented history of frequent anger displays across different
situational contexts, including off the bench, we rightly may worry about the
weak regulatory skill with which the trait underlying such behaviors often is
packaged. When we see a long history of skillful, context-sensitive emotion
regulation, we might be more comfortable in assuming that temperamental
kindness is likely to come along with it. Such assumptions should not be taken
too far: wheelhouses are typical zones, not automatic ones. Good evidence
about experiential traits can raise presumptions about self-regulatory ones (and
vice versa), but the presumption should be tested.
****
As this Part has explained, the traits about which we should talk when we
talk about judicial temperament sound in emotional experience and regulation.
Psychology supplies a deep explanatory mechanism for why certain substantive qualities—like compassion—are common features on temperament wishlists, and why others—like arrogance—occupy the opposite pole. It also validates our collective instinct that patience, the ability to keep a level head, and
maintenance of a courteous demeanor are deeply rooted—rooted, as we now
can see, in self-regulatory dispositions. By ignoring psychological insights
about a fundamentally psychological construct, we have remained unable to
theorize why these qualities and behaviors properly are clustered together, and
to identify where they come from. Perhaps this lacuna arose because understanding the construct requires us to traffic outside traditional concepts of legal
reason and to speak the language of emotion. Law is deeply uncomfortable in
that space. That is, however, the space we must enter if we aspire for a workable concept of judicial temperament.
This Part has revealed, too, that extant accounts have missed certain traits.
Courage is an important aspect of a good judicial temperament; high trait fearfulness and anxiety pull against it. It also has revealed a few surprises. Compassion is a critical aspect of judicial temperament not despite its emotional
nature but because of it. Capacity for flexible emotion regulation is not just a
helpful skill for judges to cultivate, but a deeply rooted job requirement on
which judges are likely to vary widely. 268
268
See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 231, at 4 (noting emotion management as a
skill critical to judicial excellence but one on which judges vary).

2020]

Judicial Temperament

2137

Moreover, the insights corralled in this Part can help us feel more sanguine about the prospect of principled sorting of judges into temperamental
categories. As particularly advantageous experiential traits tend to come clustered with advantageous self-regulatory ones—and as the opposite also is
true—we can identify one temperamental prototype that is generally likely to
be ill-suited to any sort of judging and another that is likely to be well-suited to
most. Between these poles, we should examine unique combinations of temperamental dimensions within any given judge and hold them up against the
unique attributes of distinct judicial environments. For example, a judge with
strong high-arousal positivity may be more suited to an active trial-court assignment than a cloistered appellate one. That judge, however, will also need
particularly strong regulatory skill to nimbly navigate constant interaction with
lawyers, litigants, juries, and the public without being sidelined by irritation
and frustration. Such goodness of fit analysis will help us discern the best and
worst bets for exhibiting preferred judicial behaviors in the predictable parameters of that environment.
The insights undergirding the psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament also have implications for efforts to support judges’ optimal growth within their envelope of possibility. Regulatory capacity is perhaps the best target
for such efforts. Sufficient skill in emotion management can mitigate the negative behavioral expressions of even entrenched reactivity patterns, and the latter may be harder to dislodge. Regulatory capacity often continues to grow
over the life span. Though by adulthood growth trajectories are nowhere near
as malleable as they were in childhood, they never are completely fixed.269
Interventions in teaching regulatory skill have shown great promise in other
professional populations, particularly medical professionals, though they have
not yet been tested with judges. 270 To be sure, the weaker the dispositional regulatory skill and the more emotionally provocative the judge’s typical work
environment, the less likely it is that any such change will be dramatic. 271 We
therefore would do well to invest primarily in judges high in trait self269
See White et al., supra note 249, at 352–53 (showing that cognitive regulation is strongly
associated with age, but changes the most in early childhood).
270
Maroney, supra note 222, at 1521 (citing to, inter alia, Daisy Grewal & Heather A. Davidson,
Emotional Intelligence and Graduate Medical Education, 300 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1200 (2008)). See
generally Rachel A. Cameron et al., In Search of Compassion: A New Taxonomy of Compassionate
Physician Behaviors, 18 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 1672 (2015) (observing effective interventions in
the medical field); Leeat Granek et al., Nature and Impact of Grief Over Patient Loss on Oncologists’
Personal and Professional Lives, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 964 (2012) (presenting novel evidence of grief among oncologists, with impacts on both them and their work, and articulating need for
education for doctors “on how to manage difficult emotions”).
271
See Rueda, supra note 165, at 147 (stating that regulatory efficiency depends in part on the
strength of the emotional processes against which effort is exerted).
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regulation. 272 We should not presume, however, to know the limits of any given
judge’s envelope of regulatory possibility, which may surprise. Further, because
many judges already on the bench will display relative regulatory weakness—
given that we have not systematically selected them with this trait in mind—and
because the demands of judging require even those with regulatory strength to
become stronger, programs to increase regulatory skill always will add value. 273
Of course, judges with the least advantageous temperamental wheelhouse
are already on the bench. Accordingly, we should be realistic about the level of
intervention that may be needed to have a chance of moving them into acceptable territory—and the fact that they may never get there even with intervention. Moreover, our lack of a solid theoretical foundation has prevented us from
knowing what effective interventions might even look like. The more we are
able to develop such interventions for a diverse array of judges and judging environments, the more we can be confident in concluding that any given judge,
having failed to improve even with intervention, is irreparably unfit.
The psycho-legal theory thus buttresses, sharpens, and expands upon our
core instincts about judicial temperament. The temperamental slice of desired
judicial attitudes and behaviors does indeed have deep roots in the person.
Temperaments can be trained and shaped, but are not infinitely malleable.
Even when our only data source is evidence of these traits in different domains, such as in private life or non-judicial work, those data should be taken
seriously as predictors of judicial behavior, if those domains share relevant
features with the judging environment. If used as the starting point for a robust
research program, the theory promises to materially improve our use of judicial temperament as a guide for selecting, sorting, and supporting judges.
III. WHAT WE OUGHT NOT TALK ABOUT WHEN WE
TALK ABOUT JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT
The research supporting the psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament
exposes the unduly narrow scope of accounts like Solum’s, which singles out
just one relevant emotional trait. 274 It similarly reveals the overbreadth of accounts like Rosen’s, 275 which folds in every aspect of a judge’s personal life
and judicial philosophy. Providing a principled basis for distinguishing tem272
Maroney, supra note 222, at 1555 & n.395 (suggesting that “extraordinary” judges who regulate emotion well, doing “naturally what we tell them not to do” and achieving “privately what we
discourage publicly,” “perhaps” are the ones “we think of as having a good judicial ‘temperament,’ an
oft-invoked but profoundly underspecified quality”).
273
Id.
274
See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.
275
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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peramental factors from everything else a judge brings to the bench forces us
into more specific and disciplined discourse. It prevents us from using temperament as either a smoke screen or conceptual dumping ground.
As this Part explains, the psycho-legal theory helps us see what desirable
judicial traits are not temperamental. 276 This Part further warns against falling
into common fallacies that have plagued former discourse on human temperament. 277 Moreover, specifying the complexity of judicial temperament cautions
us against adopting simplistic formulae for assessing it.
A. Not All Desirable Judicial Traits Are Temperamental
As we have seen, one important aspect of delineating what judicial temperament is is to clarify what it is not—not just by reference to that which is oppositional, but also to that which is orthogonal. Psychological research strongly supports accounts like that of the ABA Standing Committee guidelines, which distinguish temperament from the judicial qualities of integrity and professional
competence. 278 Surely this is correct. Even the most temperamentally ideal person would be a terrible judge if she had no ethical barometer or deeply subpar
legal training and skills. The psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament, however, also reveals a particularly important way in which even the best-supported
accounts have gotten it wrong. The ABA Standing Committee guidelines, like a
number of others, include in their temperamental construct “freedom from bias”
and “commitment to equal justice under the law.” 279 Declarative commitments to
equality are not temperamental, but rather land squarely in the domain of abilities and beliefs—important, but lacking all the temperamental hallmarks such as
heritability and durability.280 Commitment to equality—for example, along lines
of race, sex and gender, sexual orientation, disability, and nationality—is a high
order, culturally specific set of thoughts, beliefs, and values. So too is the belief
that the good society is one in which such multiple forms of human existence are
to be encouraged even when they are not one’s own—indeed, even when we do
not fully understand or endorse them. Such thoughts, beliefs, and values are an

See infra notes 278–285 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 286–311 and accompanying text.
278
HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 3. See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR, supra note 31 (separating
the concept of judicial temperament from other qualifications); NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra
note 231 (delineating a wide variety of desirable judicial attributes and skills, most delineated as nontemperamental).
279
HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 3.
280
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
276
277
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important aspect of personal identity on which people vary, but they are not
rooted in temperament. 281
The one sense in which commitments to equality and diversity are temperamental is that they would be predicted to occur somewhat more frequently
in those who are dispositionally open-minded—a quality that, as we have seen,
is promoted by trait positive emotionality. 282 Open-mindedness creates a space
within which such commitments might find a home; the commitments fill that
space with a specific set of ideas. Put differently, it would be difficult for a person to arrive at declarative commitments to equality and diversity without a
certain quantum of open-mindedness. It is, however, entirely possible not to
hold such commitments, despite open-mindedness. For example, a person who
is naturally open to new experiences and learning, but who is never exposed to
information about people different from her—or who is exposed only to negative information and judgments about such people—is unlikely to develop
such commitments.
A similar point can be made about trait kindness. Naturally high levels of
empathy, compassion, and prosocial behavior would be expected to make a person more likely to understand and care about the experiences of those unlike her.
Trait kindness, however, in no way guarantees its extension across salient societal dividing lines. Ample research shows that we often dole out empathy, compassion, and prosocial behaviors more frequently to people whom we regard as
“like us.” 283 What sorts of persons one regards as within that zone—whether
explicitly or implicitly—depends on one’s thoughts and beliefs about dissimilar
persons. A committed racist may exhibit enormous empathy and care for those
within his racial group and their exact opposite outside of it. A white person who
has developed a heartfelt commitment to anti-racist ideals might remain firmly
opposed to all forms of equal treatment for lesbian and gay persons. A judge
might act on an instinctive empathy for a defendant who reminds him of himself
twenty years prior, but feel no such connection to a defendant of a different gen281
KAGAN, supra note 111, at 77 (explaining that many differences among people have little or
nothing to do with temperament, such as “acquired knowledge, opinions, beliefs,” learned skills, prejudices and “tolerance toward others”); Rothbart, supra note 32, at 13 (placing these among the many
important, culturally-driven aspects of self that “clearly go beyond traits”).
282
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
283
See Stefan Stürmer et al., Empathy-Motivated Helping: The Moderating Role of Group Membership, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 943, 955 (2006) (“[E]ven in benign intergroup encounters . . . the role of empathy in helping is contingent on perceived group-level (dis)similarities.”); see also
John F. Dovidio et al., Extending the Benefits of Recategorization: Evaluations, Self-Disclosure, and
Helping, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 401, 420 (1997) (exploring how recategorization affects the in-group out-group model); Bernd Simon et al. Helping Individuals or Group Members? The
Role of Individual and Collective Identification in AIDS Volunteerism, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 506 (2000) (finding people more willing to volunteer for people they identified as
their own group).
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der, race, or class—or even one who went to a different college. Emotional dispositions do not create declarative beliefs or override implicit biases. Rather,
they are channeled and bounded by them.
Accordingly, declarative commitments to equality and diversity should be
understood as an aspect not of temperament but of ideology. Packing such
commitments within the domain of judicial temperament is a particularly consequential example of the conceptual slippage that bedevils extant accounts.
Consider that the ABA Standing Committee declares philosophy and ideology
off-limits in its evaluation of judicial nominees. 284 Doing so allows it to preserve its image of political impartiality. Nevertheless, declarative commitments
to equality and diversity are an important qualification for judicial office in a
diverse democracy. Because it would be intolerable in the contemporary United States for a committed, overt white supremacist (for example) to be considered qualified, the ABA has to package commitments to equality and diversity
somewhere—and temperament is the floppy construct into which these homeless concepts can be shoved.
Pulling these commitments out of where they never belonged is important. Doing so requires us to admit that some aspects of a judge’s ideology
actually do matter as a condition of entry. 285 Explicitly positioning commitments to equality and diversity within ideology, and accepting that at least this
aspect of ideology is non-negotiable, requires us to articulate explicitly what
specific set of beliefs and values are unacceptable in a judge, and why; what
we can and should do actively to inculcate them; and when we collectively can
conclude that a given person’s antidemocratic values are too ossified to
change.
B. Avoiding Caricature and Clumsiness
The psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament carries implications for selecting judges, sifting them into the environments to which they are temperamentally best suited, supporting the improvement of temperamental baselines through
HOW IT WORKS, supra note 11, at 3.
Chemerinsky, supra note 95, at 631. Further, as this requirement is not rooted in temperament,
it is likely to be more highly malleable than those that are. Claims of dramatic change in belief structures (for example, by a prospective judge who disclaims biased views held as a young person) are at
least somewhat more likely to be credible than are claims of dramatic change in temperament. Institutional efforts to move belief structures in desired directions also would be expected to be—on average—at least somewhat less challenging. It is important, however, not to be overly sanguine about the
promise of moving judicial beliefs and values through the sorts of stand-alone “diversity training”
initiatives on which organizations typically rely. Changing beliefs and values may be easier than
budging temperamental traits, but both are hard, and some models are more successful than others.
See Katerina Bezrukova et al., A Meta-Analytical Integration of Over 40 Years of Research on Diversity Training Evaluation, 142 PSYCHOL. BULL 1227, 1227 (2016).
284
285
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judicial evaluation, counseling, and education, and—finally—establishing bases
and mechanisms for judicial removal. Every new theory presents new pitfalls,
however, and this one is no different. Its primary dangers are overdeterminism
and oversimplification in the move from theory to practice.
First, any claim about stable categories into which humans reliably can be
sorted invites reduction to a parlor-game exercise. As Kagan explains:
Every age has a preferred explanation of the obvious differences
among people that always are a focus of curiosity and a topic for
gossip. The most persuasive accounts attribute most of the human
variation to one causal mechanism, for the mind likes single-process
explanations over those that involve multiple forces; the latter are
difficult to grasp and therefore less pleasing. 286
Indeed, Galen’s four-part typology owes no small part of its two-millennia cultural run to its simplicity. The contemporary United States, no longer quite in
Galen’s sway (and arguably less obsessed with Zodiac signs than we were several decades ago), has enthusiastically embraced our own four-part temperamental typology. The four Harry Potter houses—“brave Gryffindor, gentle
Hufflepuff, smart Ravenclaw or ambitious Slytherin”—have become a popular
way to capture perceived types. 287 Sorting Hat aficionados are making important life decisions, such as marriage, based on this magic mechanism that
ostensibly reveals one’s essential, unwavering core. Startlingly, they also are
seeking to alter their behaviors and habits so they will continue to fit within the
house in which they are emotionally invested. 288 We would do well to be wary
of the tidy faddishness that so often attends typology.
Reductionist typology can be not just faddish but dangerous. Those dangers are perhaps most obvious when typology explicitly incorporates bodily
attributes. As the pioneering theorists Sheldon and Stevens put it more than
half a century ago:
Tradition has it that fat men are jolly and generous, that lean mean
are dour, that short men are aggressive, and that strong men are silent and confident. But tradition is sometimes wise and sometimes
stupid, for seldom does it distinguish between the accumulated wisdom of the ages and the superstitions of ignorance. Especially as regards physique and temperament have the conclusions of careful

KAGAN, supra note 111, at 1.
Shankar Vendantam, The Sorting Hat, NPR: HIDDEN BRAIN (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.npr.
org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=568418089 [https://perma.cc/M6YN-GTPW].
288
Id.
286
287
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students been contaminated by the stereotypes of the street and by
the dogmatism of the side-show phrenologist. 289
The references to stereotype and phrenology drive home the point that not all
temperamental typologies are whimsical or potentially benign. Consider the
work of Lorenzo and Lydia Fowler, well-known late-nineteenth-century phrenologists who were equally evangelistic about temperament. 290 The Fowlers’
work was stunningly specific in purporting to link nationality and physical attributes—particularly those associated with racial and gender difference—to
stable mental and emotional traits, which they then mapped onto suitability for
particular sorts of work. 291 The end result were assessments like this one: Africans have lower brain volume than Europeans; boast “more memory and power of observation than originality of thought”; and show little development of
the “moral brain” while having a large “social brain,” coupled with low “selfesteem,” qualities that together render them more easily enslaved. 292 The
Fowlers fed to rapt audiences similar evaluations of the inherent traits and optimal work roles of, among others, Jews, Native Americans, white women,
Scots, Poles, and the French. Although their work is an extreme example of
how distorted ideas can shape temperamental classification and the nefarious
ends to which such classification can be put, the Fowlers were not alone. Even
Sheldon and Stevens, while decrying such tendencies, made generalizations
about the temperamental attributes of Jews and “Negroes.” 293
We have a responsibility in our own time to ensure that taking temperament seriously does not provide cover for reductionism. This would be an easier task if adult temperament—the trait dimensions themselves, the specific
ways in which they express in observable behaviors, and the ways in which we
assess them—were cleanly separable from social and cultural influences. This
is not the case. First, as we have seen, environment and life experience shape
temperament’s development within the envelope of possibility.294 Socially salient categorizations such as race, class, and gender, as well as exposure to particular stressors such as poverty and war, are aspects of environment and life
289
WILLIAM H. SHELDON & S.S. STEVENS, THE VARIETIES OF TEMPERAMENT: A PSYCHOLOGY
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES 1 (1970).
290
Noted Phrenologist Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1896, at 10.
291
Lydia N. Fowler, Temperaments: Their Classification and Importance, A Lecture, in LECTURES ON MAN: A SERIES OF DISCOURSES ON PHRENOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY 53, 53–68 (New

York, S. R. Wells & Co. 1880) (setting forth an astonishing array of racialized and gendered temperamental typologies).
292
Lydia N. Fowler, Formation of Character, in LECTURES ON MAN: A SERIES OF DISCOURSES
ON PHRENOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY, supra note 291, at 267, 278.
293
SHELDON & STEVENS, supra note 289, at 1, 211 (critiquing the crude typologies of the past
while simultaneously opining on the characteristic temperaments of “Negro and Jewish” persons).
294
See supra notes 138–157 and accompanying text.
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experience. 295 This reality underscores the importance of being open to temperamental diversity above baselines. We would not, for example, want to treat
dispositional fearfulness at any level as disqualifying. Not only would such a
practice violate the theory’s requirement that we evaluate traits in their full
context, it would disadvantage judges in whom that trait reflects childhood
adversity and advantage judges who have been privileged enough to escape
such adversity. The greater degree to which we embrace temperamental diversity, the greater degree to which we embrace human diversity.
Second, culture shapes emotion expression and regulation in ways not attributable to temperament. 296 Swedish judges, for example, operate within a
national culture that highly values subdued emotional displays. When they
wish to convey anger or irritation toward a long-winded lawyer, they do so by
quietly putting down their pens. 297 That signal would be utterly lost in a different cultural context. More importantly, it is not indicative of any particular
temperamental trait but, rather, of the judges’ internalization of cultural norms
for how these emotions properly are displayed. Similarly, women generally
experience anger about as much as men do, but tend to express it differently—
for example, engaging in fewer overt displays of aggression—because of gendered acculturation to distinct behavioral expectations. 298 Outside observers
thus may mistake differential display patterns for reliable signs of a person’s
underlying temperament constellation. Furthermore, they may do so in a biased fashion, reflecting implicit assumptions about what behaviors are normal
or abnormal for a given type of person. 299
Some have made this case with regard to Senator Lindsey Graham’s differential temperamental assessments of Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh. At
Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing, he quoted anonymous lawyers who de295
Jerome Kagan, The Bases for Preservation of Emotional Biases, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION,
supra note 167, at 64, 65–66; see Xinyin Chen at al., Culture and Temperament, in HANDBOOK OF
TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 462, 462–74 (exploring evidence of cultural differences in reactivity and regulation, and possible explanations, including exposure to daily stresses); Nicole M. ElseQuest, Gender Differences in Temperament, in HANDBOOK OF TEMPERAMENT, supra note 32, at 479,
479–92 (finding that gender impacts temperamental development and expression, though mechanisms
are unclear, and that “males and females are similar on most but not all psychological behaviors,
traits, and abilities”).
296
Batja Mesquita & Dustin Albert, The Cultural Regulation of Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF
EMOTION REGULATION, supra note 245, at 486, 496–503; Fraser Watts, Emotion Regulation and
Religion, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION, supra note 245, at 504, 504–20.
297
Bergman Blix & Wettergren, supra note 224, at 35.
298
See Deater-Deckard & Wang, supra note 180, at 133 (observing few if any sex differences or
cross-cultural variations in anger traits, though culture and gender norms influence whether and how
dispositional anger is displayed); Else-Quest, supra note 295, at 488–89 (noting impact of gender
socialization and stereotyping).
299
See Else-Quest, supra note 295, at 485–86 (identifying the risk that those perceiving behaviors
will interpret and respond to them differently based on gender).
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scribed her as “excitable,” “angry,” “aggressive,” and “nasty,” and suggested
that she examine her temperament problem. 300 Following Kavanaugh’s dramatic display of anger at his confirmation hearing, in contrast, Graham raised
no such concerns and rallied behind that display. 301 This distinction revived
objections of a race- and gender-based double standard. 302 The specifics of that
contrast can be (and surely will continue to be) debated. It is true, however,
that in evaluating judges’ temperament we run the risk of invoking taken-forgranted standards that could lionize affective styles associated with particular
social, experiential, and cultural backgrounds, while demonizing others. 303 In
Kagan’s words, a society that seeks to enshrine differences in order to exert
hierarchical control will find it expedient to freeze human qualities into categories that serve that goal. 304
The proper response to deeply bad science that has been put to deeply bad
uses, and to the human biases that influence how even good science is used, is
not to stop investigating the scientific target and making use of what we
learn. 305 Indeed, taking the science of temperament seriously is our best bet for
avoiding the dangers of reductionism. The unguided “common sense” of any
given group of decisionmakers—the kind of folk wisdom that has driven temperamental assessment to date—is appealing in its simplicity, but it necessarily
reflects a situated set of often-unwarranted assumptions and blind spots. 306 The
300
See Sen. Graham Questions Judge Sotomayor About Her Temperament, C-SPAN (July 14,
2009), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4752632/sen-graham-questions-judge-sotomayor-temperament
[https://perma.cc/7ZQ2-N6NF].
301
See Kavanaugh Hearing: Transcript, WASH. POST. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/news/national/wp/2018/09/27/kavanaugh-hearing-transcript/?utm_term=.db4b708438d4
[https://perma.cc/Q9HV-KXMW].
302
See James Oliphant, Sotomayor Hearings: Is Judge a Temperamental Bully?, L.A. TIMES
(July 14, 2009), https://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/07/sotomayor-hearings-is-judgetemperamental-bully.html [https://perma.cc/QL87-XGE5] (noting that Sen. Lindsey Graham was
repeating allegations also surfaced by Jeffrey Rosen, and that “Sotomayor’s defenders suggested she
was being portrayed as an irrational, overly emotional Latina in a way that a man in her position
would not be”).
303
Green & Roiphe, supra note 62, at 498–99, 522 (arguing that efforts to regulate “judicial discourtesy” by reference to ideals of dispassion have operated as means to deter “the development of
diverse judicial styles,” particularly the “more colorful style of judging associated with ethnic minorities,” and to solidify the power of elites). It also would be wrong to assume that a judge who consistently speaks in a loud voice is evidencing poor regulation or discourtesy, as she might be wellregulated, empathic, and acculturated to a particular vocal style.
304
KAGAN, supra note 111, at xiv–xv, 10–11. Indeed, given the ways in which essentialized
notions of human difference were used to justify the Holocaust, Kagan found himself not being “completely happy” with what his research revealed about temperament; he would have preferred to find
that human traits are dependent completely on environment. Id. at xxi–xxii; see id. at 11, 35.
305
Id. at xxiii (asserting that, with adequate scientific grounding, society will “recognize[] that
temperamental variation does not pose a threat to democratic and egalitarian ideals”).
306
Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851,
856 (2009).
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psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament provides grounded tools for understanding a complex reality. It orients us away from potentially biased surface evaluation and toward deep sources. The evil specter, though, and even
the silly one, does require us to proceed with great care.
Finally, going beyond that which is silly or evil, making a good theory
operational can be clunky. An instructive example comes from corporate personality testing. It has become common for U.S. corporations to make hiring,
firing, work assignment, and promotional decisions based on personality
measurement tools, many of which use the well-validated Big Five criteria. 307
Indeed, a large industry supports this practice, the big idea of which is essentially the same as that behind the pen-and-paper vocational aptitude tests given
to generations of junior high school students. That big idea is, basically, goodness-of-fit thinking. Just like those seventh-grade tests that said you would be a
great firefighter or entertainer, however, the practice is highly imperfect. Even
where tools accurately measure the personality factors of interest, the impact
of those factors on work performance varies—for example, by the specific sort
of work, levels of worker autonomy, how work teams operate, reward structures, and degrees of work stress. 308 Personality testing has also raised concerns about distortion of diversity goals, perhaps because of biases built into
the tools themselves. 309
No matter how the psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament is operationalized, simple reliance on a single assessment tool is highly unlikely to be
appropriate. Single-shot assessment of supposedly fixed qualities of people so
as to slot them into predetermined work roles oversimplifies a complex human
reality. It also can draw attention away from a wider universe of options—such
as seeking to enhance growth in needed qualities, and altering work environ307
Richard D. Goffin et al., Forced-Choice and Conventional Personality Assessment: Each May
Have Unique Value in Pre-Employment Testing, 51 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 840,
840 (2011); Neal Schmitt, Personality and Cognitive Ability as Predictors of Effective Performance at
Work, 1 ANN. REV. ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. & ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 45, 46 (2014); see
CARVER & SCHEIER, supra note 22, at 28 (“[T]he five-factor model seems to offer the best promise of
a consensus about the dimensions of personality that trait psychology has ever seen.”); John et al.,
supra note 113, at 114–19 (listing the Big Five domains as extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience). Certain of the Big Five personality domains
enjoy significant overlap with temperamental ones, though the degree to which this is so actively
remains under scientific debate. See Rebecca L. Shiner, Personality as Lasting Individual Differences
in Emotions, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 167, at 61, 61–64 (describing “personality
traits as ‘temperament grown up’”). Attention to this debate will be important should any effort to
apply the psycho-legal theory rely on Big Five measurement tools.
308
Frederick P. Morgeson et al., Reconsidering the Use of Personality Tests in Personnel Selection Contexts, 60 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 683, 710 (2007); Deniz S. Ones et al., In Support of Personality Assessment in Organizational Settings, 60 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 995, 1011–16 (2007); Schmitt,
supra note 307, at 54.
309
Schmitt, supra note 307, at 52–53.
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ments so as to incentivize and facilitate desired behaviors. Indeed, the corporate world is now broadening its assessment norms with these concerns in
mind, both seeking multiple perspectives on employees’ attributes and examining those perspectives in light of fit with individualized work expectations.310
This trend mirrors a similar one in actuarial assessments of legally-relevant
behavior, such as recidivism risk. Increasingly, such tools are being conceptualized as risk-and-needs assessments, capturing relevant indicators in a way that—
first—outperforms individual human judgment, and—second—can guide human
judgment, with the objective of matching any given person with the level and
kind of supervision and services that will minimize her risk and maximize her
chances of thriving. 311 A successful operationalization of the psycho-legal theory
likely will reflect the spirit of this turn. Temperamental assessment tools could
be designed to identify any given judge’s areas of strength, obstacles to judicial
success, and supports needed to improve professional outcomes.
This Part has thus far flagged danger zones as we consider how the psycholegal theory of judicial temperament may be leveraged to catalyze practical advances. It has not tried to solve these issues, as it would be ill-advised to jump
quickly from theoretical framing to operational utility. What is called for is a
careful empirical research program to test, refine, and potentially alter the theory
itself, and then consider, with rigor, how to systematically transform processes of
judicial selection, training, support, evaluation, discipline, and removal to take
better account of what the theory reveals about judicial temperament.
IV. REIMAGINING 2018 IN LIGHT OF THE PSYCHO-LEGAL
THEORY: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
The 2018 debate over Justice Kavanaugh’s temperament, with which this
Article began, represents a dramatically squandered opportunity to engage in a
principled public conversation about judicial temperament. 312 One initial
measure of the psycho-legal theory’s value, then, is the extent to which it could
have informed that debate. If its conceptual framework could have sharpened
collective understanding of the aspect of the controversy that was actually
310
David W. Bracken & Allen H. Church, The “New” Performance Management Paradigm:
Capitalizing on the Unrealized Potential of 360 Degree Feedback, PEOPLE & STRATEGY, June 2013,
at 34, 39.
311
See, e.g., MARK W. LIPSEY ET AL., CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM, IMPROVING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON EVIDENCE-BASED
PRACTICE 22–27 (2010); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT 101: SCIENCE REVEALS NEW TOOLS TO MANAGE OFFENDERS 1 (2011), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/
uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2011/pewriskassessmentbriefpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP8P-J42G].
312
Indeed, the theory has already been cited as a useful intellectual framework for organizing that
debate. Robert Barnes, Questions Linger About Nominee’s Judicial Temperament, WASH. POST, Oct.
6, 2018, at A5.
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about temperament, and if it could have facilitated reasoned dialogue about
that aspect in a shared, empirically-grounded language that avoided reductionism, then this important moment in U.S. judicial history might have thrown off
more light than heat.
This is a tall order, given the complicated and potent mix of other considerations simultaneously at play in the Kavanaugh nomination. The most obvious such consideration was the truth or falsity of sexual assault and harassment
allegations, on which it is not useful here to opine. Their truth or falsity was
relevant, but in a unidirectional way. If they were true and known to Kavanaugh to be true, then no portion of his behavior at the hearing was defensible, whether as a matter of temperament or of integrity. If they were not true,
or if they were not known by Kavanaugh to be true (or if he was unaware of a
significant risk that they might be true and that he might be unable to recall the
events), however, the temperamental debate is legitimate, but complicated.
Without offering an opinion on the ultimate answer to that debate—which
would be speculative—the psycho-legal theory does clarify the terms with
which we should have had it.
Take as a starting proposition that then-Judge Kavanaugh’s emotional
displays at the hearing, which included clear expressions of anger, frustration,
and contempt, were highly unusual and counter-normative for that formal, public, and consequential setting. On this, there is wide consensus. 313 From there
opinion forked in two general directions. Detractors saw the extreme display of
negative emotion as indicative of destructive traits that Kavanaugh generally is
able to keep under wraps, but that had been revealed by the extreme pressures
of the situation. 314 Defenders cast that display as an appropriate episodic response to an extraordinary situation that was unlikely to recur, certainly not in
a work setting, and thus as diagnostic only of the depth of his legitimate selfregard and care for his family. 315
The psycho-legal theory contemplates that either narrative could be
true—for example, because behavior under stress can be revealing of temperament, but can also be aberrational. The behavior itself is not a conclusive inSee The Senate Should Not Confirm Kavanaugh: Signed, 2,400+ Law Professors, supra note 3.
See Feldman, supra note 103.
315
The Senate Should Not Confirm Kavanaugh: Signed, 2,400+ Law Professors, supra note 3;
see Barnes, supra note 312 (collecting arguments pro and con, including by quoting UCLA Law Professor Eugene Volokh as saying “I can’t imagine how I would keep my composure in such a situation,
even if I (like Judge Kavanaugh) were a judge who had a decade-long reputation of calm and politeness during the ordinary work (including the controversial work) of a court”); Richard North Patterson, Opinion, The Telling Role of Character in the Ford-Kavanaugh Controversy, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 30,
2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/09/30/the-telling-role-character-ford-kavanaughcontroversy/zqAFTKwLaZxmF5lRftr9SJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/YV7P-5XRN] (stating that the
judge “revealed his reflexive belligerence”).
313
314
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dicator of the source from which it springs. In determining which view was
more likely to be accurate, the psycho-legal theory would have counseled examination of, among other things: past, documented incidents of similar behavior in similarly stressful, or less stressful, situations; the lack of such behavior in similarly stressful, or more stressful, situations; and the extent to
which environmental factors may have facilitated or constrained our access to
direct evidence of such behaviors (for example, in the generally cloistered
world of appellate chambers). As the primary concern was with Kavanaugh’s
displays of negative emotion, we might also have looked for reliable, consistent signs of positive emotionality and kindness, including in trying circumstances, with which trait negative emotionality tends not to be clustered. If
such evidence was muted or absent, a move from negative behaviors to negative trait might be more supportable, and if it was present (particularly at high
levels and across meaningfully varied situations), that move would be less so.
The psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament would have also directed separate consideration of available evidence of then-Judge Kavanaugh’s
relative skill with self-regulation. In making that assessment, it would be relevant to determine whether Kavanaugh deliberately chose to express his negative emotions as he did. Such a choice would raise concerns not about his regulatory capacity but, rather, the normative status of the reasons for making that
choice. 316 If, instead, his actions reflected dysregulation—that is, inability to
conform to his valued norms—then our concern would be not only the normative content of the ideas he expressed but also the extent to which the episode
could be indicative of deep-seated regulatory deficits. Evidence about his typical regulatory skill and default emotion-regulation strategies then would have
become highly relevant. 317 One also ought to have asked whether the predictable demands of serving on the Supreme Court of the United States would create new situations that, although about profoundly different things, might cause
regulatory demands to exceed Kavanaugh’s regulatory capacity. If that was
likely to be true, one would have wanted to ask whether the Court’s culture,
316
Peter Baker & Nicholas Fandos, Show How You Feel, Kavanaugh Was Told, and a Nomination
Was Saved, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/kavanaughvote-confirmation-process.html [https://perma.cc/T2UT-W32R]; cf. Barnes, supra note 312 (quoting
Harvard Law Professor Richard Lazarus as saying he did not know if Kavanaugh’s expressions of
partisanship arose from “uncontrolled fury” or “political calculation”).
317
For example, suppression of emotional experience and expression, which might appear to an
outside observer as calm neutrality, is consistent with periodic, extreme anger outbursts. See Maroney,
supra note 222, at 1549–50 (“[R]eactive attempts to suppress subjective experience stand an equally
poor chance of neutralizing emotion, but they add to those costs the danger of emotional rebound.”).
But even a dispositionally calm, patient person with good emotional regulation skills can have such an
outburst. Pattern evidence, therefore, is the most generally informational in seeking to determine the
degree to which an individual outburst is indicative of traits.
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norms, and constraints would sufficiently cabin the impact—on the Justice, on
his colleagues, on cases, and on the public image of the Court—of instances of
self-regulatory failure.
Some of these factors were indeed in play during the confirmation debates. For example, Kavanaugh’s supporters pointed to his lengthy tenure in
judicial service without temperamental complaint. 318 Detractors called attention to other alleged episodes of dysregulated anger and aggressive behavior.319
Even these relevant points were unable to be fully developed, however, given
how quickly they became intertwined with positions on truth or falsity of the
assault and harassment allegations. 320 Legitimate temperamental arguments
quickly were cast as positions taken by warring camps, not as sensitive, complicated matters calling for thorough and sensitive public dialogue. 321
Further, the ways in which people largely talked past one another on the
issue of temperament muddied an independently important conversation about
ideology. 322 It was not just then-Judge Kavanaugh’s emotional expressions that
were extraordinary.323 So too was his overt invocation of political partisanship.
Some of his words and actions reasonably could have been interpreted not just
as a (potentially justified) complaint that he was being victimized by such partisanship, but also as a declaration that he personally identified in an explicitly
partisan manner and would continue to do so on the Court. 324 Like commit318
Hatch, supra note 4 (stating that the judge’s “critics seem to be aghast that he is a human being who is unwilling to take slander lying down,” and that “this whole ‘temperament’ argument is a
non sequitur” given that the ABA report showed that “[l]awyers and judges overwhelmingly praised
Judge Kavanaugh’s judicial temperament”); Ventresca, supra note 4. Some commentators also made
at least rudimentary goodness-of-fit arguments. See Michael Barone, Opinion, It’s OK for Judges to
Be Angry, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion
/michael-barone-its-okay-for-judges-to-be-angry [https://perma.cc/9CJ2-TCJQ] (stating the importance of judicial temperament for trial judges, but asserting that “[a]ppeals courts can function
tolerably well even with very nasty judges”); Ruben Navarrette, Jr., Opinion, Kavanaugh’s Emotions
Showed He’s Human. That’s a Good Thing in a Supreme Court Justice., USA TODAY (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/10/18/brett-kavanaugh-fit-supreme-court-emotionaltestimony-shows-human-column/1662723002/ [https://perma.cc/8XPA-WN6Q] (asserting that the
“left” is trying to “‘get’ Kavanaugh” on temperament, but that he likes a judge “with an emotional
streak” and comparing Kavanaugh to the state-court judge who sentenced Larry Nasser).
319
Judi Hershman, I’ll Never Forget Brett Kavanaugh’s Anger, SLATE (Nov. 5, 2018), https://
slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/11/brett-kavanaugh-ken-starr-heidi-heitkamp-republican-campaigndemocrat.html [https://perma.cc/5ZC5-7PD2].
320
Id.
321
See supra notes 318–319 and accompanying text.
322
See supra notes 318–319 and accompanying text.
323
See The Senate Should Not Confirm Kavanaugh: Signed, 2,400+ Law Professors, supra note 3.
324
Barnes, supra note 312 (quoting retired Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, who was
sufficiently concerned about the partisan elements of Kavanaugh’s behavior as to counsel senators to
“really pay attention to it”). Another relevant discussion about beliefs and values might have revolved
around whether evidence of the nominee’s kindness reliably revealed that kindness to be selective. Cf.
Lisa Blatt, I’m a Liberal Feminist Lawyer. Here’s Why Democrats Should Support Judge Kavanaugh.,
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ments to equality and diversity, strength of identification with a political party
is a set of beliefs and values that is both orthogonal to temperament and highly
relevant to judicial fitness, particularly the duty of impartiality. An extraordinarily important debate began to unfold over whether such a display of apparent partisanship revealed beliefs so strong and operational as to signal unfitness—not because of temperament, but because of ideology. That important
debate, however, was partly drowned out by the temperamental morass into
which it was pitched. 325 A less toxic, more grounded set of theoretical ground
rules might have allowed us to separate these independently critical aspects of
fitness, and to examine the mainstream position that no aspect of ideology is
relevant at the judicial selection phase.
This discussion of the Kavanaugh nomination will not harmonize passionately held positions, nor is it meant to. It does demonstrate that a psychologically grounded dialogue about temperament would have maximized potential to talk with one another and not past one another. The lack of a shared theory and vocabulary made it difficult to have a conversation that did anything
but sharpen division, and conceptual slippage made it difficult to untangle
temperament from the other considerations at play. Unfortunately, public debate over U.S. Supreme Court nominations in highly polarized political times
may prove impervious to even the most compelling theory. One hopes that this
is not the case. But even if this is so, the dialogue-disciplining potential of the
psycho-legal theory presumably will be greater in the much larger, less public,
and less politicized determinations of temperamental fitness happening every
day across the country.
CONCLUSION
This Article has offered a psycho-legal theory of judicial temperament to
replace the ill-defined ones of our past and present. That theory proposes that,
POLITICO (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/02/im-a-liberal-feministheres-why-i-support-judge-kavanaugh-219081 [https://perma.cc/SH7H-62HL] (“Kavanaugh is a great
listener, and one of the warmest, friendliest and kindest individuals I know.”); Stephanie Kirchgaessner & Jessica Glenza, ‘No Accident’ Brett Kavanaugh’s Female Law Clerks ‘Looked Like Models,’
Yale Professor Told Students, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/sep/20/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court-yale-amy-chua [https://perma.cc/768Z-GGEL].
325
Editorial, Even if Kavanaugh Is Innocent, His Confirmation Could Damage the Supreme
Court, DES MOINES REG. (Sept. 28, 2018), https://eu.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/editorials/
2018/09/28/brett-kavanaugh-confirmation-damage-supreme-court-credibility-christine-blasey-fordchuck-grassley/1443593002/ [https://perma.cc/9R24-PXWX] (calling attention to alleged partisanship
but mixing it into discussion of judicial temperament); Editorial, The Irish Times View on the US
Supreme Court Nomination: America’s Disgrace, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018) (same), https://www.
irishtimes.com/opinion/editorial/the-irish-times-view-on-the-us-supreme-court-nomination-america-sdisgrace-1.3645055 [https://perma.cc/3C9Z-MVSC].
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far from being either a mystical quality or one that can be captured with a
back-of-the-envelope inventory, judicial temperament is a complex but coherent construct, one deeply harmonious with psychological concepts of human
development. How well or poorly a particular judge lives up to the temperamental expectations of judicial office depends to no small degree on his or her
tendencies toward particular patterns of emotional experience and regulation.
These tendencies are deep. They are, by adulthood, only imperfectly malleable.
They drive behavior, particularly in the stressful situations that typify most
forms of judging. The behaviors we most want from our judges are rooted in a
tendency to feel positive emotions such as satisfaction and joy; a strong disposition for empathy, compassion, and prosocial action; and facility with shaping
emotions and their expression in service of the proximate and distal goals of
judging. The behaviors we least want from our judges are rooted in a tendency
to feel negative emotions such as anger and fear; low dispositional kindness;
and a rigid, constrained regulatory repertoire. Judges will present with a range
of temperamental constellations, only some of which will be at the extremes of
ideal or disqualifying. A judge’s temperamental wheelhouse—that is, the aspects of their trait constellation that most habitually find expression in behavior—is an important determinant of the kinds of judicial assignments to which
she will be best or worst suited. It also is an important determinant of the kinds
of training and support that will both minimize any risk she poses to the reality
and perception of justice, and maximize her chances of personal and professional flourishing. The psycho-legal theory also urges that courage be recognized as an aspect of judicial temperament, and that commitments to equality
and diversity instead be recognized as an aspect of ideology. Finally, it cautions care in further theoretical development and in moving from theory to implementation.
This new theory of judicial temperament stands up well as a theory. A
theory should, first, explain. This one explains why we have persisted in our
belief in the existence and importance of something called judicial temperament, despite our equally persistent inability to get our arms around it. The
belief persists because it reflects a deep truth about human beings. Our inability to get our arms around judicial temperament has, until now, persisted because we have failed to plumb available insights from our sister discipline of
psychology. That inability also reflects our reluctance to face judicial temperament’s emotional core.
A theory should also predict, a function “more subtle and more difficult.” 326 This one predicts that specific traits will manifest in desirable judicial
behaviors (or their opposite) in interaction with specific features of diverse
326

Carver & Scheier, supra note 22, at 6.
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judicial environments. These interactions, it asserts, can be empirically captured, though to date they have not been. The theory further proposes that we
can, and ought to, develop sound methods for assessing presence or absence of
the traits that underlie any given judge’s temperamental fitness, both as a general matter—that is, whether they clear baselines—and as a specific one—that
is, to what judicial assignment their temperament is best suited. It further predicts that we can improve many (perhaps most) judges’ emotional regulation
skills with adequate investment. Whether these predictions hold true will be
shown over time, as this new theory is probed, argued with, and tested. The iterative process this Article hopes to spur will meaningfully enhance our collective understanding of this critical aspect of judicial fitness—and, ultimately, our
ability to operationalize that understanding through valid, reliable processes.
This effort is worth it. The quality of justice depends heavily on the quality of those who dispense it, and that depends heavily on temperament.

